

# The CLERGY REVIEW

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## THE MODERN APPROACH TO SCRIPTURE<sup>1</sup>

WHEN it is applied to a book as sacred as the Scriptures, the word "modern" is something of a misnomer. To many it smacks of heresy: *nihil innovetur*. . . . Certainly the approach used today is modern in the sense that it tries to use everything that modern scholarship has to offer, and that it reaches conclusions which would make our grandfathers' hair stand on end. But it is not modern in the sense of new, or novel, or unheard of. It is as old as the hills. It is in all honesty simply a return to the approach of the Fathers, who insisted on using every scientific means available in their time to reach the true meaning of the Bible, in the conviction that every advance in human knowledge could only serve the cause of truth.

In other words, the modern approach to the Bible refuses to treat the Bible (as it was treated for centuries) as the private reserve of the theologian, jealously fenced off from everyone else, so that he could be left undisturbed to dig for its *divine* dogmatic texts to prove his thesis. Similarly, the modern approach refuses to regard the Bible (as it was in the last century especially) as a subject for mere literary analysis, something which has been shown up under the microscope for the very *human* thing that it is, and on the whole exploded. The modern approach insists on treating the Bible in such a way that neither what is divine in it obliterates its thoroughly human character, nor what is human in it obscures its entirely divine nature. The modern approach insists on seeing the Bible as the Word of *God* which has come to dwell among *men*, the Message which the Father has spoken in human terms to His children in order to draw them to Himself. And is this not the only truly Christian approach?

A recent book of this title<sup>2</sup> devotes its opening chapter to an analysis of how the Christian approach was lost and how a return to it is being made. The author traces the history of our

<sup>1</sup> From a talk given to the Association of Convent Schools, Highgate, May 1959.

<sup>2</sup> Dom C. Charlier, *The Christian Approach to the Bible*, Sands (1958).

attitude to the Bible from the time of the Renaissance when men began to lose contact with the liturgy (and therefore with the Bible which is its source), down through the Reformation which only exaggerated this divorce between man and the Church. He speaks of the Counter-Reformation's attempt to restrict the use of the Bible, which was becoming more and more identified with Protestantism, and of how the Bible consequently became the province of scholars and specialists, who seemed to empty it of all divine content. He speaks about the way Catholic scholarship caught up with all this a little late, and became either (in its enthusiasm) modernist or else (in sheer reaction) obscurantist. He finishes his review with the work done by Pius X and Pius XII to restore some stability, to discern what was genuine from what was false, and to direct the Church's scholars in the right path. And he concludes that if this rather miserable 500 years of history is not to be repeated, we must learn the lesson that it has taught, and try in future to avoid both of the extremes to which it went. He calls one extreme "pietism" and the other "scientism".

*Pietism* is the refusal to allow the Bible to be subjected to any sort of literary analysis, as if it were a gross outrage to put this sacred book under the microscope like any other literature. The attitude is common enough: "Don't bother me with literary criticism! I'm only interested in what God has to say to me in the Bible." That attitude must go. The fact simply is that without literary criticism we cannot find out what God has said to us. The Bible did not drop ready-made from heaven. It was painfully spelt out word by word by men of flesh and blood, whose inspiration was not something that took the place of their own culture and mentality and characteristics and style and limitations, but was incarnated in them. And unless we make some attempt to reconstruct this human background as accurately as possible, we are not in touch with God's Word. We are only in touch with what we like to imagine God's Word should be. God says to us only what His inspired author says (that is what inspiration means). The pietistic, obscurantist approach, which wants to by-pass the human author out of respect for the divine Author, is in fact deriding the way the divine Author went about things.

*Scientism*, at the other extreme, exaggerates in the opposite direction, and tries to be so thoroughly scientific that it remains entirely objective, dispassionate and detached. That approach also is common enough. How many library shelves are laden with Scripture commentaries which are scientific, dispassionate and dead! And the attitude that produced them must go too. The Bible is the Word of God, which cannot be studied by us without demanding a response from us. The Bible is God's revelation of Himself to us which cannot be understood without faith and love. To stay on what is called the objective level in the cause of science is in point of fact being most unscientific, because the Bible of its very nature demands commitment.

Which of these two inadequate approaches is the more dangerous? The second one, the approach of the detached scientist? In fact it is the other one. At first sight, certainly, the scientific approach seems to kill the Bible altogether. It simply analyses, dissects, dismembers, and apparently leaves us in the end with the torn shreds of some human remains, which are of no interest to anyone except the archaeologist. But in fact it is this rigorously scientific method which has given us an insight into the true meaning of the Bible which the merely pietistic and unscientific method could never have achieved. Without the scientific approach, it is doubtful whether we should ever have had a theology of the Bible.

The book of Jonas will provide a good practical example. Any Catholic commentary written fifty or even twenty-five years ago (in some cases one would not need to go any further back than ten) accepted the book quite literally, as the surface reading suggests, as an account of the remarkable adventures of a prophet in the eighth century B.C. Why was it written? For no other reason than that it happened. This is the record of a stupendous miracle which God worked to manifest His power to unbelievers of all ages. The commentators would consider it heretical or at least highly offensive to pious ears to suggest that it is not strictly historical, and they spend so much space defending its plausibility that there is no room left at all to discuss its meaning. Indeed, they would ask, is there any meaning to discuss once it has been established that the event happened?

It is the scientific method which first thought it rather odd

that the book of Jonas should be so utterly different from all the other prophetic books, which contain preaching, not narrative. It is the scientific method which first analysed the style and the language of this book and fixed it in the fifth century B.C. It is the scientific method which first asked the question why an author of that date should describe the Mediterranean cruise of a prophet 300 years earlier. The Israel of the fifth century B.C. had closed in on itself, and with complete self-satisfaction in its own righteousness complacently waited for the final coming of God's Kingdom. Could it be that the fifth-century author is writing a satire on this age of his, which is happy to remain shut in on itself and let the pagan world go to hell? Because Jonas is not the hero of the book at all; with all his obstinacy, petulance and selfishness, howling as he does for the destruction of sinners, he is a very accurate picture of this fifth-century Israel—or of the man in any age at all who has identified God with his own narrow ideas of Him. Is there anyone armed with that sort of approach who can read the book of Jonas and not recognize himself in it? The modern approach demands that sort of scientific method, and that sort of theological conclusion, and will not be satisfied with anything less.

Perhaps that was not a particularly fair example; everyone has always suspected that there is something fishy about the book of Jonas anyway. Let us take another example, the books of Josue and Judges. Again, the uncritical approach takes these books quite unquestioningly as history books pure and simple. This is what happened in the years 1250 to 1050 B.C., and it is recorded for that reason alone. This is the day-to-day account of how Josue conquered the land of Canaan and of the opposition which the Israelites encountered. With books like that you do not ask questions about their theology. They are history and that is enough. And again, it was the scientific method which first showed that such a view is rather naïve. If the book of Josue has given such a complete account of the Conquest, why does the book of Judges start the whole story again from the beginning and contradict it so flatly?

Josue is entirely in a heroic key. It gives the impression that all the twelve tribes, united closely under the leadership of Josue, entered Palestine in one determined invasion, captured



the first town of Jericho with magnificent ease, and then simply tore through the rest of the country, slaughtering all the inhabitants until the whole land was theirs.

The first chapter of Judges, recounting the same Conquest, makes no mention of Josue at all, but records the slow, very laborious efforts of individual tribes to carve out a portion of this land on their own account. Far from annihilating the natives, it has to leave the embarrassed record of Israel's failure to dislodge them, and of the constant thorn in the side that they remained ever afterwards. If the same author wrote both books (and this is undisputed) why was he so incredibly inconsistent? Why didn't he make it clear exactly what happened?

Because he was not a historian but a theologian. Because he wanted to make it as obvious as possible that he is not interested in the events for their own sake but only in their meaning. He has taken up an optimistic tradition about the Conquest in order to illustrate the fact that, from *God's* point of view, there is no difficulty at all in entering the Kingdom that He has prepared for His people, that if God has promised His Kingdom then He will give it, no matter what obstacles there are in the way. And he has balanced that with a pessimistic account of the Conquest to illustrate the fact that, from *man's* point of view, that Kingdom is always eluding our grasp, because we are weak, because we are constantly falling, because we are constantly having to cry out for help to a God who is willing to forgive us seventy times seven.

It is not very good history, but it would be difficult to find better theology. And the modern approach demands that we always finish on that note. It demands that we avoid on the one hand the extreme of scientism which would leave us with an accurate human knowledge of the Book but with nothing else. It also demands that we avoid the extreme of pietism which would leave us with our notion of God, but not with what God has revealed of Himself to us.

If these examples show something of the difference between the old approach and the new, it might be useful to complement

them by giving a summary of the modern scholarly view of each of the main sections of the Old Testament.

### THE PENTATEUCH

The first section of the Old Testament is the Pentateuch, the five Books of Moses. Until recently, the word "Moses" was taken quite uncritically, without much appreciation of the fact that the ancient world did not have our ideas of copyright. The text used to be taken quite simply as an accurate historical account of the origins of the human race and of Israel, without much appreciation of how fundamentally the ancient writing of history differs from our own. The legislation that these books contain (from the end of the book of Exodus through Leviticus and Numbers to the end of Deuteronomy) was taken quite unquestioningly as having been fixed once and for all by Moses at Sinai, without much appreciation of how law and legislation in any civilization must grow and be adapted to new circumstances. Commentaries on the Pentateuch consisted of an analysis of the text as a straightforward account of events from creation onwards, composed by Moses from notes left him by the Patriarchs or from revelations whispered into his ear by the Holy Spirit. Even when the discoveries of science showed that the early chapters of Genesis can no longer be taken as literally as they were once, there was still no suspicion that these chapters reflected any other age or mentality but that of Moses in the year 1250 B.C.

Modern scholarship has shown that the process by which the Pentateuch was formed was far more complicated than that. Again, it was a question of the inconsistencies acting as a warning light—the repetition, for instance, of the same event in two or three utterly different styles and mentalities, or the same legal case legislated for in two or three different ways. Over the long years of analysis of these "doublets", it has been established that the Pentateuch is a sort of mosaic of four great traditions, each of which has its roots in the actual events of which it speaks, but each of which had a long oral history (with the inevitable modifications that such a history gives to a popular

tradition) before it was fixed in a written form centuries after Moses, and finally incorporated into the present form of the Pentateuch only 350 years before Christ.

The scholarly approach is to distinguish these as accurately as possible, and to detach them in order to appreciate the individual contribution of each. The "Jahvistic" tradition, as it is called, with its primitive and childlike atmosphere of a God very close to man and its attempt to answer man's most fundamental problems, is a tradition which seems to reflect the enthusiasm of Israel's youth in the early years of the monarchy. The "Elohistic" tradition reflects the more developed and conscientious sense of the early prophets about God's remoteness and supremacy, and the emphasis that this prophetic movement laid on Moses as the founder of the Israelite Constitution. The "Deuteronomic" tradition reflects the warmth and passion of the later prophets, with all their experience of Israel's apostasy under its successive kings, and their appeal to Israel's love as a response to the overwhelming love of God. Here too all the emphasis is on a return to the principles of Moses, although this is expressed in a legislation adapted to the events of the seventh century B.C. Lastly, the "Priestly" tradition reflects the final development of Israel's thought in the Babylonian exile, with all its concentration on cult and liturgy. Here the whole of history, from Adam down, is told as the story of a Holy Community bound to God by successive Covenants, especially the Covenant of Sinai, to which is attached all the legislation which will assure that Israel will in future be what it must be—a Church devoted to the service of God.

The four traditions—Jahvistic, Elohistic, Deuteronomic and Priestly—are entirely parallel to one another. They deal with the same basic facts, but each time from a new viewpoint. To distinguish them does not diminish the stature of Moses. It only emphasizes his importance as the supreme Legislator to whom all future ages will look back. The stature of the Pentateuch is increased even more. It is no longer merely a record of the past, a sort of porridge in which everything is of the same grey consistency. It is a collection of all that is finest in Israel's tradition, from one end of their history to the other. This will for ever afterwards be the Jewish Torah or Law, the expression

of God's will which must be the yardstick by which the Jew measures his life.

### THE PROPHETS

The second section of the Old Testament is called the Prophets. It begins not with Isaiah and Jeremiah, but with Josue, Judges, Samuel and Kings. This in itself is significant. It is we who called these books "historical", and took them as a straightforward account of events. The Hebrews called them the "Prophets", the work of the prophetic movement, a prophetic meditation on past events in order to draw a religious meaning out of them. The modern approach, the true approach to these books, demands that we orientate ourselves to this angle (in the literal sense of getting eastern). We westerners always tend to think in the abstract, to present doctrine in an abstract form in a way which might appeal to a philosopher. The easterner never did that. He always presented his doctrine in a way which would appeal to the imagination, and capture the interest and sympathy of the ordinary man. The Rabbi still embodies his teaching in a story, whether it be allegory or parable or a seemingly historical narrative. The last thing he or his disciples want to know is whether the persons or events or circumstances in the story are real or fictitious. The doctrine is everything; the mode of presentation has no value independent of the doctrine. To make the story the first consideration and the doctrine it conveys an afterthought (as we do) is to reverse the eastern order of thinking, and to do injustice to all the narrative parts of the Bible, the New Testament included. To seize on the historical aspect of these books and to tie oneself into knots in an attempt to reconcile their inconsistencies, out of a sense of reverence to the author, is sheer stupidity if the author never intended them to be taken as mere history.

Of course this must not be exaggerated. To draw the conclusion that these books contain no historical facts at all would be to undermine Christianity. Christianity is a historical religion, and if it does not rest upon historical facts into which God has entered in order to reveal Himself, we have no know-

ledge at all of God. That a conglomeration of Semitic tribes who later called themselves Israel occupied Palestine, that this small nation weathered the vicissitudes of raids and invasions from other peoples who were also intent on the same desirable property, that this group finally set up a monarchy and had kings named David and Solomon and Roboam and so on . . . all this is certain. We must not question the historicity of anything unless we have grounds for doing so. We must not come to the conclusion that history does not matter so long as some religious theme is being taught. This would be heresy. These books do contain history, as every page of the Bible does.

But—and this is the point—they are not history books. They are not books in which the main interest is in the events themselves. They are all theological interpretations of historical events. The same events are used by different theologians to express different theological truths. So that, in order to understand the purpose of these individual books (Josue, Judges, Samuel, Kings and the rest), it is absolutely essential to have some notion at least of the theological viewpoint from which the author is writing. The Deuteronomic viewpoint, for instance, of the author of Josue—Judges—Samuel—Kings, who wants to present a picture story of God's unmerited love and Israel's failure to respond to it. The Priestly angle, for instance, of the author of Paralipomenon—Esdras—Nehemias, who wants to present a picture story of Israel as a Church with only one vocation, the worship of God. If we fail to orientate ourselves to these angles, we shall miss the whole point of what we call the "historical" books of the Old Testament. They are not books written to inform the readers about the past, but to guide them into the future, and to give them a deeper understanding than their forebears had of what God's Kingdom on earth must be.

When we come to the Prophets proper (Isaias, Jeremias, Ezechiel, Daniel and the twelve minor prophets), the modern approach demands first of all that we place them very accurately in the context of their time. And this, to begin with, will mean that some of our prejudices must go. We mentioned Jonas, who has to be moved from the eighth to the fifth century B.C., but Jonas is not really typical because he is not strictly one

of the prophets at all. More typical is a book like *Isaias*, on which so much critical work has been done in the last 150 years. Is there really any point in refusing to budge from our conservative position about *Isaias*, when all scholars of any standing have agreed that the second half of this book is not the work of the prophet *Isaias* but of a school of disciples spreading over 300 years after *Isaias* lived? It is not as if we are going to lose anything by accepting those conclusions. Who has a fuller understanding of the prophet *Isaias*, the man who confines all sixty-six chapters to the eighth century B.C., or the man who insists that *Isaias*' influence lasted over 300 years after he was dead? Who has a richer view of inspiration, the man who conceives of it as a rare gift bestowed here and there on a few chosen individuals, or the man who sees it as something continually at work in the whole community, guiding it and enriching its meditation on the words of its prophets in the past? The modern approach demands a similar revision of ideas on the context of books like *Daniel* and some of the minor prophets.

But the greatest advantage in this insistence on the context in which the prophets belong lies in the deeper understanding it gives of the whole prophetic movement. In our neglect of this context, we have made the prophets a sort of *Old Moore's Almanac*, a series of exact predictions of the New Testament—*Malachi* on the Precursor of Christ, *Micheas v* on Bethlehem, *Isaias vii* on the Virgin Birth, *Isaias lxi* on the miracles, *Zacharias* on Palm Sunday, *Isaias liii* on the Crucifixion and Resurrection . . . any school book will amplify the list. The rest of what the prophets had to say is not important at all. It is a mere envelope of pious exhortation, telling people to be patient and wait for it. If this is all the prophetic books are we might as well throw them away. The New Testament has made them redundant, except for those people who like to amuse themselves by looking back at all these "clues" which God gave hundreds of years beforehand, so that they can sit back and marvel how clever He was.

The history of the Jews was not simply a waiting for Christ, as though God had nothing at all to say to them, except "Wait for it!" It was a history in which constantly and continually

God revealed Himself and His nature and His will and His purpose here and now. And of that purpose, the prophets were the spokesmen and the interpreters. They were not primarily concerned with foretelling the future, but with *forthtelling* God's plans here and now, in the present. If they meditated on the past, if they looked forward to the future, it was always to focus the whole of it on the present, on the People of God who here and now needed His Word. They did not foretell the future so much as build it, shape it, make it happen; so that when their hopes were finally realized in Christ, He did not fit them like the second half of an equation, but filled them to overflowing, to show that far from being exaggerations they were understatements. Their hopes were for the ruined Temple to be rebuilt, so that God's presence could come and dwell in their midst again; instead God gave them His own Presence in the flesh and blood of Christ, which all men could share for all time. Their hopes were for a future in which the Kingship, the Priesthood and the Prophetic office, so frequently at loggerheads, would be finally reconciled and at peace; instead God gave them one Person in whom these three functions were fused into one, the Supreme Mediator for all time between God and man. Their hopes were for the ideal King who would be the perfect representative of God's rule over His people; instead He came Himself to be with His people for all time.

If these prophetic books were simply a number of accurate predictions, we could throw them away when they were fulfilled. Their meaning would have been exhausted. But if instead they give us something much wider—the constant proclamation of the nature of God's relationship to us—we shall never have done with reading them. When Christ comes as the final proclamation of this truth, we do not stop reading the prophets, we begin. We begin for the first time to understand what exactly they were getting at.

#### THE WRITINGS

The last section of the Hebrew Old Testament is called the Writings. It comprises the Psalms, the Wisdom Books, and those miscellaneous writings like Ruth, Paralipomenon, Esdras,



Nehemias, Machabees, Judith and Esther, which were composed too late to be included in the other two categories. About these miscellaneous books nothing more need be said here except to include them in the remarks made above about the "historical" books in general. About the Wisdom Books and the Psalms, we may again assure ourselves that we have nothing to lose but everything to gain by being a little more modern, a little more critical, about the titles Solomon and David written at the top.

Considered as a homogeneous mass, the Wisdom books become simply the pious maxims of a garrulous and not always consistent king. In fact they represent the most important development of Jewish thought in the last 500 years B.C. on the Problem of Evil, which traditionalists like Tobias, Proverbs and Ecclesiasticus tried to by-pass, while pioneers like Job and Ecclesiastes put the tradition to the most severe criticism, in order to produce finally the serenity and calm of the book of Wisdom, only 100 years before Christ.

As for the Psalms, when they were considered as a homogeneous collection of David's prayers, they were treated rather like the prophetic books, a dozen or so famous texts foretelling Christ, surrounded by a lot of pious verbiage. It is by placing them as accurately as possible in their right context that modern scholarship has shown the true value of the Psalter, as a reflexion of every age of Israel's history, from David down to the Machabees, the meditation and the prayer of the whole of God's people on the march. It is because the Christian knows that he belongs to the same caravan that he has recently become more and more conscious that he ought to take these prayers on his lips too. He does not have to be embarrassed by the words Jerusalem, Kingdom, Temple, Law, as if for him they had a completely different meaning, or did not fit in his mouth. They fit all the more readily once the Christian has seen all these key words fulfilled in Christ. These prayers will for ever be the words in which the Father has taught us by His Spirit to pray for the one thing that he wishes to give us, which is His Son.

If we have laboured the need for real scholarship in approaching the books of the Bible today, it is because in the last fifty years scholars have produced a revolution in Scriptural matters, and it is simply no longer possible to pretend that this revolution has not taken place. But our last weight should be put in the opposite scale. This scholarship could give the impression of being almost entirely negative, and focus all our attention on the points where the oldfashioned approach was wrong: the creation did *not* take place in six days, Mathusala did *not* live to be 969, Jonas was *not* in the whale, these Psalms were *not* written by David, Solomon did *not* write the book of Ecclesiastes, Daniel did *not* foretell the future. . . . In a sense, perhaps, that emphasis is healthy, because it keeps our mind off the inessentials. After all, what do these things matter? But the one thing we must not do is to imagine that that is the end of the matter. It is only the beginning. That side of things is merely negative, the necessary clearing of the ground for the positive explanation of the text. When we have done a piece of scientific literary criticism, it does not mean that we have done a piece of exegesis. We have only to put ourselves in a position to start, to enter the mentality of the sacred author, to see with his eyes. If that author has not given us, for example, very good history, that does not mean that what he writes is not true. It means that he is concerned with a far higher kind of truth. If he had merely given us history, we should have had good history but no God. Instead he has given us a story of God as his faith has seen it, and he has told us what God has done, what God is like, and what God wants to do for us. Is not that honestly more worth while?

H. J. RICHARDS

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### ST AUGUSTINE'S THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PREACHING

**B**EFORE his conversion Augustine had been a professor of rhetoric. In the ancient world the study of rhetoric was the crown of a university education, and there is little doubt that

Augustine had acquired a considerable reputation as a teacher of the subject. With such a qualification to his name, he came as a godsend to the Catholic Church in Africa.

Perhaps it is an exaggeration, but not I think a great one, to say that by the end of the fourth century this Church had sunk into a dejected and fossilized formalism. Its strength had been sapped by the Donatist schism; it lacked the crude and violent vigour of the sectaries, who preached their cause with clubs; but it shared with them a stuffy insularity which seems to have been characteristically African, and which effectively stifled any positive apostolic and evangelical initiatives.

Thus it had long been considered a custom of sacred inviolability that only bishops had the right to preach. This was no more than the preservation by petrification of the sound Gospel principle that preaching is the prime apostolic function of bishops. One suspects that the custom had grown up as an unconscious excuse for a widespread if not total neglect of this basic pastoral duty. Most of the bishops were too busy, or too scared of the Donatists (who indeed were terrifying people), or too conscious in that age of rhetorical culture of their own lack of training and eloquence; and if they did not preach, surely in decency nobody else might. So the instruction of the faithful and the defence of the Catholic cause went by default in deference to a most respectable custom.

It is not too much to say that Augustine revived the Church in North Africa by reviving preaching, and it was largely his professional qualifications as a rhetorician that enabled him to do so. But it was a grace of providence that there were two bishops in Africa big enough to make use of this providential recruit. The first was Valerius, Bishop of Hippo, an old man and a Greek who could not preach effectively in Latin; so he broke with the aforementioned venerable custom, and made Augustine, still only a priest, do his preaching for him. The second was Aurelius, a man of Augustine's own age, Bishop of Carthage and quasi-patriarch of all North Africa from Tripoli westwards, who determined to widen the breach in custom Valerius had begun. It was his aim to train up clergy to preaching while they were still young. He made his priests preach in his presence as a matter of policy. And he commissioned Augus-

tine to write a textbook which would help the clergy to equip themselves for the work of instructing and preaching. The result is the *De Doctrina Christiana*.<sup>1</sup>

It is only the fourth and last book of this work that deals specifically with preaching. The first three are about Scripture, on what to find there and how to find it. But then it is Scripture alone that provides the Christian orator with his text. I am not here using the word "text" in the mean and beggarly sense in which we talk about a preacher's text nowadays, when we mean little more than a motto, or the equivalent of a chapter title in a book. Augustine seldom if ever preached on a short text in the artificial modern way. But almost all his sermons could be described as variations on the text of Scripture.

In this practice of soaking his sermons in Scripture Augustine shows himself not only at his most Christian but also at his most classical. Classical pagan rhetoric was a wholly literary art built on and out of classical literature. The professional orator spoke in the idiom of Cicero and Virgil, Livy, Tacitus, Ovid, and Terence; he tried to fit his mind to their minds, and the more he succeeded in fitting the world of his own experience into the categories of theirs, the better an orator he was thought, and thought himself, to be. The classics were the fount of his aesthetic and moral values, the channel of his deepest reflexions, the ambience of his personal and social life. It is not surprising that such a man should be repelled by the Bible, and consider it to be an irrefutable argument against the truth of Christianity, because such an obvious evidence of its impropriety. But once Augustine had overcome this sort of fastidious repugnance and acquired a new literary taste, it came naturally to him to substitute the new literature, Christian and divine, for the old pagan classics as the very stuff of his thought, his writing, and his preaching.

As well as being his practice, this was also quite explicitly his theory. Even from the congregation, at least a cursory knowledge of Scripture is demanded, an acquaintance that can be picked up by attending the Church's liturgy; the preacher must

<sup>1</sup> This is my reconstruction of the situation—a reading between the lines of Augustine's Letter 41 in conjunction with the *De Doctrina* and the history of it given in the *Retractationes*.

have a much deeper familiarity with the sacred text, which can only be the fruit of intense personal study and reflexion. And the less native or cultivated eloquence he has at his command, the more he must rely on the inspired eloquence of Scripture.

Augustine's attitude to the formal rules and techniques of rhetoric was free and uncommitted. His professional career as a teacher of the art had not made him a pedant. Not that he undervalued style, or thought it a waste of time to study its principles; but a young man being trained "for ecclesiastical use" might well have more important studies to attend to which would leave him no time for a formal course of rhetoric. The best way, in any case, of learning eloquence is to make a habit of reading eloquent authors. To appreciate the force of this recommendation, we should remind ourselves that by "reading" Augustine meant "reading aloud"; in the *Confessions*, VI, 3, he remarks on Ambrose's habit of reading *silently* as something most unusual.

In the fourth book of the *De Doctrina Christiana* he gives extensive extracts from eloquent Christian authors, St Paul, the prophets, Cyprian and Ambrose, and analyses the elements of their style. I think we may say in passing that he himself found St Paul's torrential, spontaneous style much more congenial than the highly polished elaboration of the two Latin writers. I will try to distil three points from the advice he gives in this book. It is worth remarking that it was written towards the end of his life, more than twenty-five years after the first two and a half books, and so it gives us the mature experience of a lifetime of preaching.

The first thing a preacher must do is suit his style to his purpose. He may have two primary purposes, to teach his audience or to move them (*flectere*); and one subsidiary purpose, to give them pleasure. When you want to teach you must speak simply and plainly; when you intend to move or sway you need more power and must pull out more stops, bring a wider range of expression into play; and when your immediate aim is to gratify your hearers, a more deliberate artifice and embellishment of style is permissible.

Augustine realizes that this division is a little unreal. Whether a preacher is trying to give instruction or exhortation, he has

to hold his audience's attention and he should try and make them love the truth he is proposing for their belief and the good he is urging them to do. That is the function of eloquence. Why should truth, Augustine asks, meet her enemies unarmed? Why, we might add, should she have to stand comparison with her seductive rivals looking frumpish and dowdy? In the *De Doctrina* he suggests, by his analysis of his exemplar authors, that this giving of pleasure is just a question of a more studied eloquence. But his own practice, in my estimation, was far more spontaneous and effective. The preacher is trying to teach or move *people*, to entertain *people*, hold *people's* attention. So his sermon must be in effect a dialogue disguised as a monologue. The pleasure Augustine's sermons give is mainly due to the skill with which he makes the listener think that he is engaged in a conversation with him. He is constantly constructing little conversations, which one can picture him having with himself, with much lively gesticulation and expression, in the pulpit. Usually of course he took the winning side in these little exchanges, and his imaginary interlocutor represented the misguided or wicked attitude Augustine was arguing against. But he was quite capable of switching roles and putting his congregation on excruciating tenterhooks while their bishop appeared to be arguing a false case. There is a delicious passage from the first sermon on Ps. 70, in the *Enarrationes in Psalmos*. He comes to verse 15, which reads in his version "My mouth shall declare your salvation, because I have not known businesses". He comments: "Let business men take note, let them change their profession . . . let them not approve of their business, but rather condemn it, censure it, give it up—if business is a sin." After a little more in that vein, he concludes: "So then, if the reason the psalmist could utter God's praises all day long was that he did not know businesses, it is high time Christians mended their ways—they must give up their businesses." One can imagine the stir of consternation among the shopkeepers of Hippo, whose imaginary representative now intervenes: "But then the business man says to me, 'Look here, I bring my goods a long distance to places where they could not otherwise be had, that is how I earn my living; to sell things dearer than I bought them is like asking wages for my labour. . . . You object to the

lying and perjury involved. Well, that is my fault, not the business's . . .'; and he goes on to make out a powerful case for the honest broker. The passage ends: "That is what the business man could say to me. 'Well, Bishop, you must find some other way of understanding what is meant by these businesses you have read about in your psalter; else *you* will fail to understand, and *I* will be denied the right to my business. By all means admonish me on how I ought to live; it will do me good if you do it well. One thing I am certain of—if I am bad, it is not my business but my own wickedness that makes me so.' Well, when someone states the truth like that there is no gain-saying it."<sup>1</sup> Loud sighs of relief all round.

It is this genius for buttonholing his audience, and the vividly realist imagination that goes with it, which give Augustine's sermons their unrivalled power. It is not that he eschews the devices and arts of rhetoric; his sermons are full of memorable phrases, effective assonances, little rhyming jingles, poetic images and expressions. But you will search them in vain for the solemn grandeur of St Leo's discourses. Augustine was not a stately preacher. I think he could have been, but he deliberately chose not to be, because he never forgot the actual people he was preaching to, of whom not one in a thousand shared his own literary culture. One sometimes wonders how much the ordinary illiterate populace of Rome can have learned from St Leo's magnificent sermons. In all probability he had both a narrower and a wider audience in view, the ecclesiastics of the Curia, and the whole Christian world. Augustine preached first and foremost to the people in front of him.

I would like here to give two extracts, both on the theme of "All the world's a stage", to show the difference between his mature popular style and the rhetorical elegance he was capable of, but great enough to leave behind him. The passage on the left is from *Serm. 216*, which he preached while still only a priest. In my opinion it shows that Augustine could have surpassed Leo at his noblest, if he had wished to. The passage on the right is from *Enarr. in Ps. 127*, and needs no comment.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This passage is printed in full in Henri Marrou's book *Saint Augustine in Men of Wisdom* series, English translation published by Longmans, 1957.

<sup>2</sup> I first made this comparison in an article in *Blackfriars*, November 1954, in which I quoted rather more widely than here from Augustine's sermons.



Infantia vestra innocentia erit, pueritia reverentia, adolescentia patientia, juvenus virtus, senium meritum, senectus nihil aliud quam canus sapiensque intellectus. Per hos articulos vel gradus aetatis non tu evolveris, sed permanens innovaris. Non enim ut decidat prior secunda succedet, aut tertiae ortus secundae erit interitus, aut quarta jam nascitur ut tertia moriatur; non quinta quartae invadebit ut maneat, nec quintam sexta sepeliet.

Optas ut crescant filii, ut accedat aetas. Sed vide quia veniente pueritia moritur infantia, veniente adolescentia moritur pueritia, veniente juventute moritur adolescentia, veniente senectute moritur juvenus, veniente morte moritur omnis aetas. . . . Nati pueri tanquam hoc dicunt parentibus, "Eja, cogitate ire hinc, agamus et nos mimum nostrum." Mimus est generis humani tota vita tentationis.

The second point for the preacher, which follows as of course from this need to make friends with his audience, is that he should preach *extempore*, not come along with a sermon learned by heart. Supposing his purpose is to give instruction; he cannot be said really to have said anything until those he is instructing have understood what he is trying to teach them. If he is genuinely preaching and not simply putting on a show, or making a fine noise, he must go on trying to make his point, varying his approach, amplifying his illustrations, until the audience show that they do understand. If they understand after a single brilliant sentence, then he can leave out all the illustrations, and the little stories he had up his sleeve, and go on to the next point. Again, if he is trying to move them, to make them ashamed of themselves, to get them to turn over a new leaf, he must go on until he sees some effect, that is until he has them in tears.

It must be confessed that Augustine's African audiences gave him much more support than any English preacher can hope to get from our stolid congregations. They sighed, and wept, and laughed, and clapped, nodded their heads, frowned in bewilderment, gasped with horror or pleasure—in a word they were responsive. Doubtless they could also be more mercilessly hostile and show boredom and indifference more offensively than the modern English churchgoer. But a point to notice is that Augustine wooed his people into responding. He respected the Christian people, whom he calls in this connexion the *cognoscendi avida multitudo*. He treated them with

proper courtesy, calling them *Fratres* or *Caritas Vestra*, he neither ranted nor droned at them. In a word, he loved them, and this affection for his people can be heard in every sentence of his sermons, even when he is speaking to them with utter frankness about their vices, even when he is telling them that they are not putting enough in the collection (*Serm. 66*).

Preaching *extempore* does not mean that one comes to the pulpit unprepared; it means that one's preparation is so deep and thorough, the subject so completely mastered, that one's presentation of it can be made to fit the circumstances and the mood of the moment. It also means that the preacher must be armed with his own and the people's prayers. Augustine hardly preached a sermon in the course of which he did not stop to ask the people to pray for him so that he might be able to explain some difficult point as well as possible. It is clear of course that he enjoyed a quite exceptional flexibility of mind. One day he had prepared a short psalm to expound to the congregation, but the lector sang a different and much longer one (138) by mistake; "so I prefer, he said, to follow God's will in the lector's mistake, rather than my own in my original purpose".

The third point for the preacher, which also follows from what he ought to be trying to do, is clarity. There is one quality of Scripture, and of some of its great ecclesiastical expositors too for that matter, which the preacher must on no account imitate, and that is its obscurity. A necessary statement of the obvious—his audience must be able to understand what he is saying. Not that the preacher should adapt his subject to his audience, and only preach on easy doctrines to "simple souls", those perennial excuses for clerical laziness. They are actual or potential Christians, and so they must have the whole of Christianity preached to them, they must be well instructed in the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, of Grace and Election. It is the manner of exposition that must be adapted to the capacity of the hearers. That is why Augustine forbore to preach in the grand style. He was even prepared to throw grammar overboard if it helped to avoid ambiguity, or so he says. African ears, apparently, could not distinguish between the short "o" of *os* a bone and the long "o" of *os* a mouth. So if it should be necessary to make himself clear, the preacher should use the

low-class word and call a bone *ossum*. That is Augustine's precept; but I doubt if he could ever really bring himself to carry it out in practice. I have not come across any instance. But without being grammatically incorrect he could be colloquial enough, occasionally perhaps to the point of vulgarity; well, at least he said things that could scarcely be said with seemliness by a preacher today. He was neither squeamish nor prudish.

Augustine realized that there are many clergymen for whom having to preach is torture and always will be, excellent priests who are also inarticulate. But preaching remains a cardinal part of their priestly office. If they cannot preach sermons of their own, they should read the sermons of others to their congregations. This is at least better than that the people should hear no sermon at all. As for Augustine himself, anyone less inarticulate it is hard to imagine. Speaking came easily to him, and he thoroughly enjoyed it, of that I am convinced. Sermons so full of life cannot have proceeded simply from a stern sense of duty. He enjoyed preaching because he believed in it with his whole heart, and put all his heart into it. And in this respect above all, surely, he is to be emulated. If a man preaches with zest, the likelihood is that he is preaching with success.

EDMUND HILL, O.P.

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## OUR LOVE FOR ANIMALS

THE above question constantly arises, and we are often being asked, especially by non-Catholics, what is the attitude of the Catholic Church on this matter.

It seems worth while, therefore, to attempt some answer, based on the positive statements of people high in the administration of the Church, whom none in his wildest moments could accuse of sentimentality. It is all the more important since a completely erroneous declaration of the Church's attitude has been put forward by Catholics of some authority. This has given grave scandal both in European countries and in the United States.

At the outset we should clarify the issue by stating that we

are not *bound*<sup>1</sup> to love any animal whatsoever. It is natural, of course, to love certain animals, especially those nearest to us, dogs, cats, horses, which return our love and render incomparable services.

But what we *are* bound to do is to refrain from ill-using God's creatures, because that would be abusing the dominion which He has given to us over them.

The fact of our dominion is established by Genesis i, 28. And our late Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, unassailable in his pronouncements on the animal question as on every other, said in 1950<sup>2</sup>: "One will recognize that the Creator has given the animal to serve man: who, because of his intelligence, is essentially superior to the entire animal world."

There is more than a hint here that man, having the superior gift of intelligence, and being in the image of God, and therefore sharing His administration of created things, must interpret God's wishes in the use he makes of the dominion bestowed upon him. Nowhere, ever, is there the least indication that man, if he is cruel to animals, is expressing in any way the attributes or the intention of the Creator. Here we may quote Cardinal Manning:

It is perfectly true that obligations are between moral persons, and therefore the lower animals are not susceptible of the moral obligations we owe to one another, but we owe a seven-fold obligation to the Creator of those animals. Our obligation and our moral duty is to Him who made them; and if we wish to know the limit and the broad outline of our obligation, I say at once it is His nature and His perfections, and among those perfections one is, most profoundly, that of Eternal Mercy. . . . And in giving dominion over His creatures to man, He gave it subject to the condition that it should be used in conformity to His perfections, which is His own Law, and therefore our Law.

To return to Pope Pius. With characteristic thoroughness he describes what man's attitude to the animal world should be: one of "respect and consideration". Why? Because "the animal world, as all creation, is a manifestation of God's power, His wisdom and His goodness".

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine throughout.

<sup>2</sup> In an interview with representatives of 200 Animal Welfare societies.

It would seem that the questions asked at the beginning are already sufficiently answered. But there is much more to it than that.

First, the Holy Father defines the conduct forbidden to man by the principles he has just enunciated. "Any reckless desire to kill animals, all unnecessary harshness and callous cruelty towards them are to be condemned."

We should be grateful for so forthright a declaration. For it is the flat contradiction of what has been confidently asserted, nay proclaimed, by some as official Catholic teaching: that animals have no soul (which is true) and therefore we can do what we like with them for our amusement or for no reason at all and never need feel any twinge of conscience. And that is not true.

Pope Pius gives another reason, which is really two reasons, for banning cruelty to animals, the soundness of which the records of our Police and Juvenile Courts can vindicate. "Such conduct is baneful to a healthy human sentiment and only tends to brutalize it." The word translated "sentiment" here does not mean sentimentality, but feeling, perception, judgement based on observation and instinct. The unspoilt, natural good sense of mankind condemns cruelty; where cruelty is tolerated, man becomes brutalized and callous and no longer protests against it. Especially, we may add, if there is money or blood-lust, or both, attached to it: witness bull-fighting in Spain, cock-fighting and dog-fighting in America, and the long history and slow death of bull-baiting and bear-baiting in England.

Here a remark of Cardinal Vaughan is appropriate: "Of all the motives to persuade men to practise kindness and consideration to the lower animals, a due regard to their own character is surely one of the strongest." And St Thomas says: "He who shows pity to animals is more disposed to exercise the same feeling towards his fellow man."

In June 1958 Pope Pius reaffirmed his decisions in a letter from his secretary, Mgr dell'Acqua, to the writer of this article, thanking him for some bound copies of *The Ark*.<sup>3</sup> "The Holy

<sup>3</sup> *The Ark* is the Bulletin of The Catholic Study Circle for Animal Welfare, of which Cardinal Godfrey is the President.

Father has more than once expressed his desire that unnecessary harshness and callous cruelty to animals should be avoided." He was also described as being "much gratified to receive this volume portraying the praiseworthy work of the Catholic Study Circle". What that work is can best be described in the last words of Pope Pius in the 1950 interview. "The Catholic Church strives to influence individuals and public opinion to ensure the acceptance of these principles and their legal protection in daily life."

What we should do has been laid down by the highest authority on more than one occasion not only as the norm for *our* conduct but also as a public duty for States and governments to accept, ratify and protect by legal sanctions. That, says the Holy Father, is what the Church is working to secure. That is the official decision. That holds the field. The onus of proving the contrary lies not on us but on those who profess to speak in the name of the Church in propounding the opposite view.

Incidentally, the promulgation of the latter view causes grave scandal. In the United States recently it was reported that some forty persons had ceased to attend church because they did not see how the teaching of the Church on the Mercy and Providence of God could be reconciled with the blatant cruelty of the views expressed publicly by a prominent Catholic authority. It is easy to exclaim: "Scandal of the Pharisees!" but that does not absolve those who speak in public from ascertaining the real mind of the Church.

In support of the Holy Father's declarations may be quoted the answers given to the three questions sent in to the Holy Office by Mr Weld-Blundell, through the influence of Cardinal Vaughan and a theologian attached to that Office. The answers were the same as those given in the Catechism drawn up by Bishop Bellord and those in a children's catechism in use in some parts of Germany and France: that cruelty is wrong and a sin, and the misuse of God's creatures.

We may now consider other aspects of our relations with the animal world in the light of statements made by unimpeachable Catholic authority.

First, as to this "dominion" which is so often quoted as justi-

fyng wanton brutality towards animals. Cardinal Donnet, at a public meeting in France in 1896, said:

Our power over the creatures that surround us comes from God Himself. It has pleased Him who created the world to put us over them and to make the animals obey us. But to this authority God has annexed certain duties from which we are not allowed to withdraw. By placing animals under us He has commanded us to be full of pity for them.

And in the use of animals the Cardinal lays down that an animal's strength is limited and that it should only be compelled to work within those limitations. That "is the universal law of being: the divine dispensation: it can never be transgressed with impunity".

Long before, in the fifteenth century, a commentary on the Ten Commandments, called *Dives et Pauper*, expresses similar sentiments:

When God bade man to eat flesh, He forbade man to slay beasts in any cruel way, or out of shrewdness (wantonness). *For God that made all hath care of all, and He will take vengeance upon all that misuse His creatures.* . . . Therefore they that out of cruelty and vanity behead beasts and torment beasts and fowl more than is proper for man's living, sin full grievously.

Cardinal Donnet elaborates:

The religious man becomes gentle, moderate and humane in the tribute of work he exacts from his animals. He follows their aptitudes. He sees in them the companions of his labours, and he takes good care not to cut them off from his affection and compassion. . . . Wherever evangelical piety flourishes, it spreads orderliness over country districts. . . . It is only necessary to go over the farms of the Trappists and Carthusians . . . in order to see the fatherly supervision of the work and its happy results.

With regard to this note of "fatherliness", Cardinal Bourne made a significant remark to a gathering of children in the Cathedral: "There is even in kindness to animals a special merit



in remembering that this kindness is obligatory upon us because God made the animals and is therefore their Creator and that, in measure, *His fatherhood extends to them.*"

According to the late Prior of Ealing, Dom Benedict Kuypers, it was the idea of this Fatherhood that inspired so many of God's Saints in their love of His creatures:

The Saints have ever been conspicuous for the reverence and friendliness with which they treated all God's creatures. And in studying their lives one is continually reminded of this delightful intimacy. Considering all creation *as coming from the paternal heart of God* they accepted to the letter what they believed to be the consequences of this truth. And returning to the conditions which sin had destroyed, they resumed the original powers of man over nature. . . . "All creatures obey those who serve God with a perfect heart."

Nor is this poetic fancy, but genuine Catholicism. Cardinal Hinsley wrote to me: "The spirit of St Francis of Assisi is the Catholic spirit. Cruelty to animals is the degrading attitude of paganism." The late Archbishop Downey of Liverpool indicates that consideration for animals is also sound social science:

It has been said that it is cruel to beat a cripple with his own crutches.<sup>1</sup> It is also cruel for a rational being to be wanting in consideration towards an irrational one. This Society [the R.S.P.C.A.] stands for *reason and social sanity*. Domestic animals are part of our social circle and I hope that the Society will go on flourishing until the perfect day when public conduct with regard to animals is such that there will be no more need for such a society.

It would be easy, as illustrating the mind of the Church, to quote a number of men and women canonized by the Church, such as St John the Apostle, St Benedict, the Fathers of the Desert, St Francis of Assisi, St Anthony of Padua and many solitaries especially in England and Ireland and Scotland, whose attitude is well summed up by Abbot Tosti in his *Life of the Founder of Western Monasticism*:

<sup>1</sup> See C.T.S pamphlet *Cruelty to Animals*, pp. 5 ff.

Men like St Benedict, always intent on the love of the Creator, could not withhold their love from the things He had created. Hence they found themselves bound by the bonds of fraternal love with everything in God's universe. On the other hand the irrational animals, by divine ordination, often gave their services to the holy men who, in the desert, far from human society, committed their lives into the hands of God alone. . . . The love therefore of holy men for the irrational animals is a consequence of that which they have for God, who called them out of nothing and preserves them in life. . . .

As the Archbishop of Menevia wrote in 1954: "It is sound theology to show reverence to God in His creatures. Nature is the handmaid of Religion in the animal creations as well as in the order and beauty of its lower spheres."

It would also be easy to illustrate our quotations by others from the Bible, but space allows only two further reasons, given by Archbishop McGrath of Cardiff:

The spread of Catholic teaching on man's proper attitude to animals is desirable, not only for the sake of Catholics themselves, but for the benefit of non-Catholics also. And it will much help towards recalling more frequently the Giver of all things to our minds when we use the service of animals.

We may now summarize the answers to the questions asked.

*How* should we love animals? As the Saints did, seeing them as God's creatures, and "with respect and consideration" as the expression of God's "power, wisdom and goodness". That is the official Catholic attitude, expressed in the highest quarters and never contradicted.

At the same time, not with sentimentality and selfishness, which often spoil the creature and confuse the whole issue of our relations with them. As Cardinal Donnet says, we do not befriend animals by "heaping excessive affection on them, and bestowing on them what has been denied to our fellow-men". And the Church, with all its advocacy of consideration and a sense of responsibility, "does nothing to disturb the admirable order of the Creation by despoiling man of his royal crown, to cast it down at the feet of inferior creatures". (Cardinal Gasparri.)

But that is no vindication of callousness or cruelty, whether deliberate or unthinking.

*Which animals should we love?*

We are not bound to love any: but naturally we may and should show affection for those especially who serve us faithfully, give their lives for us, and help us to bear our burdens both material and psychological.

*Why should we love them?*

Briefly, in return for all they give us in affection and service; because they are creatures of God and express His attributes, and because we, being in the image of God, should reproduce His fatherly care of these creatures also. And because the dominion given to us over them is to be exercised in accordance with the wishes of the Giver, and the nature and sensibilities of the creature.

AMBROSE AGIUS, O.S.B.

## BINATION

### HISTORY

IT IS not certain whether from earliest Apostolic times private Masses were celebrated, but it is certain that in the first years of Christianity public Masses were celebrated only on Sundays; and then later also on Wednesdays and Fridays.<sup>1</sup> To these three days Saturday was added, especially in the East.<sup>2</sup> St Augustine, who died in 430, assures us<sup>3</sup> that, while in his time Mass was celebrated in some places only on Sundays, in others on Saturdays and Sundays, it was nevertheless customary in many places to have the Holy Sacrifice daily.<sup>4</sup> This was also the situation in Spain,<sup>5</sup> in Italy,<sup>6</sup> in Constantinople,<sup>7</sup> as well as

<sup>1</sup> Tertullian, *De Oratione*, 14.

<sup>2</sup> St Basil, Ep. 289.

<sup>3</sup> Ep. 54.

<sup>4</sup> Sermo 57.

<sup>5</sup> Council of Toledo, 400.

<sup>6</sup> St John Chrysostom in Ep. ad Ephesios.

<sup>7</sup> St Ambrose, Sermo 25.

elsewhere. The daily Mass became universal about the close of the sixth century.

Piety led certain priests to celebrate several private Masses on the same day. The 12th Council of Toledo, held in the year 681, strongly rebuked the priest who, whilst celebrating Mass several times a day, communicated only during the last Mass.<sup>1</sup> Walafrid Strabon mentions<sup>2</sup> that his contemporary, Pope Leo III, to satisfy his own devotion or that of the people, offered Holy Mass even seven or nine times a day. This historian reports a great variety of practices among the priests of his time: some celebrated Mass once a day, others repeated it twice a day, or as often as they desired. On the other hand Abbott de Prüm (+ 915) mentions as a common practice, in some places obligatory, the celebration of a second Mass towards noon on behalf of strangers or pilgrims.<sup>3</sup> According to Walafrid Strabon the custom of saying more than one Mass a day arose from the usage, especially in Rome, of celebrating two or three Masses on great feast-days, such as Christmas Day, Easter, Pentecost, Circumcision, Maundy Thursday, the Vigil of the Ascension and All Souls.<sup>4</sup> St Leo I reports<sup>5</sup> that in Rome it was the accepted custom to repeat Holy Mass on the more solemn feasts, because on such days the crowds were so numerous that they could not all enter the basilica at the same time. When on such occasions there was only one priest who could or was willing to celebrate, he was obliged to celebrate several Masses on the same day. If there was a bishop, he would sing the two or three solemn Masses, even though other priests were present. These Masses offered by the same priest on one day were all solemn Masses, but this recognized custom soon led to the practice of celebrating several private Masses on the same day. When the number of priests had increased and when the fervour in many of them had diminished, the Church stepped in to limit the plurality of Masses on the same day. She did not forbid them at once, however. So we read for instance in the 39th canon of the *Canones editi sub Edgardo rege Angliæ*

<sup>1</sup> Bruns, *Concilia*, t. 1, p. 326.

<sup>2</sup> *P.L.*, t. 114, col. 943.

<sup>3</sup> *P.L.*, t. 132, col. 187.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *P.L.*, t. 128, col. 110, 906.

<sup>5</sup> *P.L.*, t. 54, col. 626.

(957-975): "Docemus etiam ut nullus sacerdos uno die saepius quam ter ad summum Missas celebret."<sup>1</sup> Similarly the Council, held at Seligenstadt in 1022, ordered in canon 5<sup>2</sup> that each priest "non amplius quam tres Missas celebrare praesumat". Later on the restriction limited the priests to one Mass a day only. Pope Alexander II (+ 1073) decreed that a priest should be content with saying Mass once a day, unless it should be necessary to offer a second—never more—for the dead.<sup>3</sup> It is to be noted that the Pope condemned only those who out of avarice or vanity celebrated several times a day; those who did so out of devotion for the Holy Souls were allowed to continue saying two Masses a day. By virtue of this custom it was permitted to celebrate two Masses also on ordinary days, which were not Sundays or feast-days. This custom was finally abolished by Pope Innocent III (+ 1216) prescribing that a simple priest should say but one Mass daily, except on Christmas, when he might celebrate three Masses, while Honorius III (+ 1227) extended this prohibitive legislation also to all dignitaries. This prescription was thereafter often repeated in various Councils, and except for some later exceptions, this decree of Innocent III regulates even up to our own days the bination or trination of Masses.

The following cases are the exceptions now expressly permitted by the Church, or sanctioned by reason of universal teaching.

1. Canon 806, §1 allows every priest to celebrate three Masses on Christmas Day, which custom dates back to the time of Pope Gregory the Great and is to be found in the Decree of Gratian.

2. Likewise according to canon 806, §1 a priest is allowed to say three Masses on All Souls Day, 2 November, a privilege originally granted by Pope Benedict XIV (+ 1758) to all priests, secular and regular, of the Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal in 1748, extended by Pope Leo XIII to Latin America in 1897 and by the Code conceded to all priests over the whole world.

<sup>1</sup> Mansi, *Conc.*, t. 18, col. 516.

<sup>2</sup> Mansi, *Conc.*, t. 19, col. 397.

<sup>3</sup> *Decr. Grat. Part III, de Consecratione*, dist. I, c. 53.

3. The third exception is the case of *bination*. This means the faculty to celebrate two Masses on the same day. This requires a special Apostolic indult or faculty of the Ordinary. The Ordinary cannot give permission to say more than two Masses on the same day (Canon 806, §2). To say three Masses a day needs a special indult from the Holy See. Only the Ordinary is the judge about the necessity of a bination. If, however, in extraordinary circumstances the priest has to make a decision on the spur of the moment, e.g. if a fellow priest who was due to celebrate the next Mass fell ill suddenly and recourse to the Ordinary is impossible, and a considerable number of people had gathered for the Sunday or Feast-day Mass, he would be allowed to say a second Mass "ex praesumpta licentia", but he should notify the Ordinary afterwards.<sup>1</sup>

The Ordinary can grant a priest permission to binate, if three conditions are fulfilled:

- i. It is a Sunday or holiday of obligation.
- ii. If there are not sufficient priests.
- iii. If otherwise a considerable number of the faithful would have to go without Mass.

The Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments and also the S.C. de Propaganda Fide sometimes grant permission to binate on ordinary week-days.<sup>2</sup> With regard to the requirement "a considerable number of the faithful" authors commonly agree that this considerable number is constituted by about twenty.<sup>3</sup>

All that is required, therefore, for bination is that a considerable number of the faithful (at least twenty) would be put to a great inconvenience to attend Mass on a Sunday or Feast-day, unless the priest said a second Mass. This condition being fulfilled, any priest in that parish or mission could make use of the faculty of bination, once the bishop has granted it. For the permission granted by the Ordinary is not personal, but territorial, and therefore a substitute for the parish priest or curate may binate.

<sup>1</sup> Cappello, *De Sacr.* I, n. 695; Coronata, *De Sacr.* I, n. 197; Noldin, *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, III, n. 206.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bouscaren, *Canon Law Digest*, I, p. 382, IV, pp. 257, 258.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Regatillo, *Ius Sacramentarium*, n. 124; Coronata, o.v. I, n. 197; Cappello, o.c. I, n. 695.

Another condition for licit bination is that no other priest is available who can say Mass at the place and the hour convenient for the priest. If the visiting priest refuses, he is not available *ad hoc* and there is no legal obligation which obliges him to say a public Mass in order to avoid one of the local priests having to say two Masses.<sup>1</sup>

#### STIPENDS WHEN BINATING

1. The general principle concerning stipends is laid down in canon 824, §2: "Whenever a priest says several Masses on the same day, and has to apply one from a title of justice, he cannot receive another stipend, excepting some compensation for an extrinsic reason." Hence, on a day when a priest binates, he is not allowed to say two Masses for stipends. If he is obliged to say the *Missa pro populo*, he may not take a stipend for the second Mass. The Holy See, however, readily allows Ordinaries to grant permission to their priests to accept a stipend also for the binated Mass, although the first Mass was said already for a stipend or *pro populo*. The Ordinary can even order that such a Mass be celebrated for a stipend. The stipend must be handed over to the Ordinary in its entirety.<sup>2</sup> The second Mass, however, may be celebrated to satisfy an obligation arising *ex caritate* or *ex obedientia*, e.g. when a priest is bound as member of a religious organization or of a clerical union. Such a Mass is not due *ex iustitia*.<sup>3</sup>

2. For *Missions* a special concession may be applied for whereby mission Ordinaries can grant that "iusta ac gravi causa intercedente sacerdotes sibi subditi pro secunda Missa in eadem die celebranda, stipendium percipere possint ac valeant".<sup>4</sup> No mention is made in this declaration that this stipend must be handed over to the Ordinary.

<sup>1</sup> Regatillo, o.c. n. 126; Cappello, l.c.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C.S. *Conc.*, 9 May 1920; *A.A.S.*, 1920, p. 536; Cappello, o.c. n. 697; Coronata, o.c. n. 261.

<sup>3</sup> Cappello, o.c. I, n. 697; Noldin, o.c. III, n. 209.

<sup>4</sup> Coll. n. 1244, 1352; cf. Coronata, o.c. I, n. 260.



## EVENING MASS

According to the new discipline introduced by the Motu Proprio *Sacram Communionem* of 19 March 1957:<sup>1</sup> "Local Ordinaries with the exception of Vicars General unless they have a special mandate, may grant permission for the celebration of Mass after noon on any day, provided the spiritual good of a notable part of the faithful requires this."

Cardinal Ottaviani, the Pro-Secretary of the Holy Office, in an article in the *Osservatore Romano* of 23 March 1957, points out that the expression "a notable part of the faithful" is the same as that used in canon 806 in regard to the local Ordinary's power to authorize bination.

EUCCHARISTIC FAST FOR BINATING PRIEST;  
PURIFICATION OF THE CHALICE

According to the rules 7 and 8 laid down in the Instruction on *Christus Dominus* of 6 January 1953, the priest who binates or trinates:

1. When celebrating the Masses one after the other without intermission, may take no ablution, not even with water. Since water does not, however, break the fast, he would be allowed to continue saying the following Masses, even though he had inadvertently made the rubrical mistake of taking ablutions with water, which rubrical transgression is not a grave sin, according to authors.<sup>2</sup>

2. When celebrating the Masses with an intermission of less than three hours, two ablutions with water only are allowed. With reference to both previous cases, "should it happen, however, that a priest who must binate or trinate, did through inadvertence take the ablution with wine, he will be able to celebrate the second or third Mass" (n. 8 of the Instruction). Note well that here again it is a question of inadvertence. According to commentators, the word "must" in the Instruction does

<sup>1</sup> A.A.S., 1957, p. 177.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. McCarthy, *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 1954, p. 419.

not necessarily convey the notion of obligation, but may convey the notion of futurity or destination. Taking the word in this latter meaning we can conclude that the priest may licitly offer a second and third Mass, even though he is under no obligation to do so but wants to do so "tantum devotionis causa".<sup>1</sup>

3. When celebrating the Masses with an intermission of more than three hours, the priest should follow the rubrics and take the ablutions with wine and water. This follows from the new rule that one is bound to abstain from solid food and alcoholic drink three hours before the next Mass or Holy Communion. This was already presaged by a declaration of the Holy Office of 16 November 1923.<sup>2</sup> The Holy Office was asked: "Whether a priest who is dispensed from the eucharistic fast before the second Mass, may take the ablutions at the first Mass." The reply was: "Affirmative." According to authors this clearly supposes that wine will be part of these ablutions. Since according to the new law of eucharistic fast of *Sacram Communionem* a priest is allowed to take food and alcoholic drink up to three hours before his next Mass, it seems evident that this should first be applied, when it will enable him to observe a rubrical law.

J. DE REEPER

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### AUDEMUS DICERE

IN THEORY, the Our Father should dominate our mental horizon whenever we think of prayer. In practice, however, routine, familiarity, with so many other forms of prayer, the scant treatment it often receives, even in *ex professo* treatises on prayer, leaves us with a rather blurred impression of the imposing contours of the prayer which Christ Himself has given us. Is there any way of recovering the spiritual impact it should make on our minds? A partial and preliminary measure is to

<sup>1</sup> Moriarty, *The Jurist*, December 1954, p. 16; Reed, *Theological Studies*, 1953, p. 217; Ford, *The New Eucharistic Legislation*, p. 91; McCarthy, *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 1954, p. 420.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bouscaren, *Canon Law Digest*, I, p. 352.

remind ourselves of its use in the early centuries of the liturgy when our forefathers had a less faded conception of its unique character.

One clue to the way in which the early Church held this prayer in high esteem can still be found in our present-day Mass. There we find it is introduced by a miniature invitory of its own: *Oremus : Praeceptis salutaribus moniti, et divina institutione formati, audemus dicere*. At once the note is struck of humble wonder and delighted surprise. There is a summoning up of our courage, so to speak; there is a feeling of "daring" which can be justified only by reference to our Divine Master's express command. This is something out of tune with the mood of many of our contemporaries. To them, God's Fatherhood is something obvious and natural in virtue of God's creation of the universe, and therefore such liturgical language must appear strained and far-fetched. At the back of their minds is a vague conviction that God's Fatherhood, in their sense of the words, is based on Scripture. The truth is, apart from a few indirect allusions in the Old Testament and one quotation from the Acts, there is little support for this assumption. St Paul does say: "As some of your poets said: For we are His offspring" (Acts xvii, 28). Yet this means no more in the context than that there is a natural likeness to God in man. Such a philosophical, or at times sentimental, conception remains in the natural order, and is incapable of moving, as such, into the new supernatural world of God's Fatherhood as revealed in the New Testament, particularly in the writings of St John and St Paul. Inevitably it fails to do justice to the status of the baptized Christian living in the new dimension of his Trinitarian life of grace.

Indeed, it is in the context of baptism and early baptismal discipline that we find the deepest references to the meaning of the Our Father on the lips of the Christian. For in this context this prayer is considered to be part of the sacred patrimony which the Christian and he alone inherits. St John Chrysostom expressly states this in his homily on the Lord's Prayer: "The laws of the Church and indeed the very beginning of this prayer itself teach that this prayer befits only the faithful [i.e. the baptized], because he who is not yet initiated cannot call

God his Father" (*Hom. 19 in Matt. P.G.*, t. LVII, 28). Theodoret of Cyrus (+ 458) uses similar language: "We do not teach this prayer to the uninitiated, but to the faithful only. No uninitiated would dare to say Our Father who art in heaven . . . before receiving the grace of adoption" (*Haereticorum fabularum compend. P.G.*, LXXXIII, 552). Long before them St Cyprian too had written: "Homo renatus . . . Pater primo in loco dicit quia filius eius iam cepit" (*De Dom. oratione. P.L.*, IV, 541).

Liturgical practice reflects this traditional teaching. In Rome as part of the initiation ceremonies for the catechumens in Lent, at the *Aperitio aurium* function, the Church handed over her three most cherished possessions to the catechumens—the Creed, the Four Gospels and the Our Father. In the case of some of the Eastern liturgies, provision was made for the solemn handing over of the words of the Our Father after the actual baptism, and the neophyte was invited by the Bishop to recite the prayer which belonged specifically to the reborn sons of God. Curiously enough, it is here we meet with the expressive phrase *audemus dicere*. It occurs in a Syrian baptismal ordo of the sixth century. This prayer was said immediately after baptism and before the anointing with chrism: "Make these worthy, O Lord, of heavenly beatitude, through the mercy of thine only begotten Son, so that both we and they, united in one mind, *may dare to invoke thee*, God of heaven, holy and almighty Father, *saying*: Pater Noster . . ." (*Denzing. Ritus Orient.*, t. I., 315). This should be compared with the introductory formula of the Syrian liturgy of the Mass belonging to the same epoch: "Make us worthy, O Lord, lover of men, so that without incurring condemnation, *we may with a pure heart . . . dare to invoke thee*, holy God, heavenly Father, *and say*: Pater noster". Similar formulae in the Byzantine liturgy lead us to suppose that there is some form of dependence between the eucharistic and baptismal use of the words *audemus dicere*. Rughetti thinks it probable that these words were originally borrowed from a baptismal source and introduced into the Mass, but in our present state of knowledge we cannot be certain.<sup>1</sup> Most of the evidence for the early use of the Pater noster in the Mass begins with fourth-century sources—St

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Manuale di Storia Liturgica*, III, 396.

Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348) in the East, and St Ambrose (A.D. 395) in the West. Admittedly, at the beginning of the fifth century, St Jerome looked upon the Pelagian neglect of the Pater noster before Communion as a deviation from general and primitive practice. He roundly asserts: "Sic docuit [Christus] apostolos, ut cotidie in corporis illius sacrificio credentes audeant loqui, Pater noster" (*Dialog. contra Pelag.*, III, 5, P.L., XXIII, 512). However, the case for a universal and primitive use of the Pater noster in the Mass is not as apodictic as St Jerome would have us believe. As is well known, its present position in the Mass is due to St Gregory who thereby ensured that no man-made prayer was to follow the magnificent liturgical doxology but the words of Christ Himself.

Undoubtedly, many influences in varying degrees played their part in giving liturgical prominence and significance to the Pater noster. Just a hint, for example, remains to us in the *audemus dicere* of the way in which the *plebs sancta* of the early Christian Community used this prayer to renew the spirit of their baptismal graces on the Lord's Day. This was the day when the work of Redemption, effected by the passion, death and resurrection and ascension of Christ, was commemorated and made present. In this way the Mass always had and has a paschal-dominical character. So even today the *audemus dicere* remains like a luggage-label out of the past to remind us of great experiences and wider horizons. It also serves to bring home to us the true basis of Christian prayer, its supernatural dimensions. We do not pray as Jews or Buddhists however devout and skilled in prayer techniques. Our "access" to the Father, our "boldness to enter the holy place", is not the outcome of our own earnest and prolonged efforts. It is in the dynamic power of our baptismal status, as the reborn sons of God, obeying Christ's express command, sure of a Father's love, a Saviour's intercession, and the pleadings of the Holy Spirit.

This prayer furthermore is essentially a community prayer and finds a natural place in the Eucharistic sacrifice which is also the sacrament of unity. "For we being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of the One Bread" (1 Cor. x, 17). This unity is always being actually produced and main-

ained in the disciples of Jesus through the Holy Spirit in order to bring them to the Father, who is Himself the first source of all unity. Not only is the Pater noster a prayer within the Sign of Unity—as Augustine calls the Eucharist—it is a direct preparation for Communion. Strictly speaking, it is not part of the Anaphora or Canon, though its three petitions for the hallowing of God's Name, the coming of His Kingdom, and the perfect fulfilment of His Will are like a prolonged echo of the doxology to the Trinity with which the Canon ends. Its true function is to serve as a preparation for Communion. This much is evident from the way in which the earliest commentaries, mentioning the Pater noster in the Mass both in the East and West, understand the petition *Panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie* in a strictly eucharistic sense. This is confirmed by the insertion of the Pater as preparation for Communion in late mediaeval liturgies when dealing with Communion apart from Mass and also in many cases of Communion for the Sick. Certainly, in view of Christ's own teaching (Matt. v, 23-4), this preparation had to take into account the petition *Et dimitte nobis debita nostra*, as Optatus Milvius made clear to the Donatists in A.D. 336. Our Communion with Christ is incomplete if it ignores our communion with our fellow Christians and need for mutual forgiveness. Whatever the sources or motives which have given us the Pater noster in the Mass, one thing is certain. It is always said as the prayer which belongs to "the children of thy mysteries". This is finely expressed in an extract from the apostolic anaphora of eastern Syria: "Make us worthy, O Lord, that inspired by the confidence which comes from thee, we may utter before thee that holy and pure prayer which thy mouth, the Giver of Life, hast taught to thy faithful disciples, children of thy mysteries: When you pray, thus shall you pray, confess and say: Our Father . . ." (cf. Jungmann, *Missarum Solemnia*, III, 205).

HUGH MCKAY, O.F.M.

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## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

THE MORALITY OF THE NATO DETERRENT  
POLICY

The present declared policy of the NATO powers is to negotiate for multilateral disarmament, but meanwhile to deter aggression by a threat of massive nuclear retaliation against the aggressor's "centres of power". It is claimed that nothing less than this threat would suffice to deter aggression, as things stand, and that if it were withdrawn by unilateral disarmament, war, even indiscriminate nuclear war, would be made more likely. On the other hand, it seems clear that the threatened form of retaliation, as distinct from nuclear attacks on legitimate military targets, would itself be morally wrong. Does it therefore follow that the NATO deterrent policy is immoral and consequently that, even if its abandonment would make war more likely, it must none the less be abandoned? (N. W.)

## REPLY

Our questioner's statement of the NATO policy would seem to be substantially accurate. Time and again, at the highest level, the threat has been repeated that, in the event of a major attack, the NATO powers would retaliate immediately with a hail of nuclear weapons directed against the enemy's homeland, and we have been assured that bombers of the Strategic Air Command and long-range ballistic missiles are kept in constant readiness to implement this threat at a moment's notice. The U-2 incident has recently indicated that an attempt would also be made to destroy hostile rocket-sites and other military installations, but no secret is made of the fact that the "centres of power" earmarked for massive retaliation include the major cities of the aggressor, the Moscows, Leningrads and Gorkis, which, however extensive the military potential they contain, are primarily and predominantly the inoffensive dwelling-places of millions of non-combatant citizens.



It may well be that this threat is nothing more than a gigantic piece of bluff in the international poker-game, which the responsible heads of government have no serious intention of carrying out, and that its sole value lies in the deterrent effect of the possibility that it may not be a bluff. Certainly, those with whom the decision lies have every reason to have already decided, in the privacy of their hearts, that it would never pay to press the button. Unable to hamstring the enemy by their first retaliatory blow, or to protect their own people against his counter-retaliation, they must know, better than most, that to implement their threat would be to sign their own death warrant and involve the world at large in unimaginable ruin. It is for this reason that neither side is content to rely on its nuclear strength and that constant efforts are being made to end the poker-game by multilateral disarmament. Both sides appreciate that, moral questions apart, the only realistic solution of the problem created by the very existence of major nuclear weapons is an agreed and effective system of control which will ensure that they are never used.

Our questioner assumes, however, not without reason, that the NATO threat of massive nuclear retaliation against enemy cities is seriously meant, and asks whether it is immoral. Our answer to the question, as put, can only be in the affirmative. Ever since Hiroshima we have never ceased to maintain and to say, as occasion arose, that the indiscriminate destruction of any normal city (other perhaps than an arsenal similar to Oak Ridge, or an evacuated bastion of the battlefield, such as was Caen) is an intrinsically evil act, because it necessarily involves a direct slaughter of the innocent which can never, in any circumstances, be morally justified. In a just war of self-defence, a predominantly civilian town like Moscow may contain many legitimate targets of direct attack, but an indiscriminate nuclear attack on such a town is not aimed directly and exclusively at these targets. It is aimed at the town as such, with all its thousands of absolutely or relatively innocent citizens living peaceably in dwellings which are in no sense part of the enemy's battlefield or war potential. Their death may not be directly intended as an *end in itself*, but at least it is directly intended as a *means* to the inclusive destruction of the war potential in their

midst and as a deterrent to further aggression by the State to which they are subject.

A positive intention to commit an immoral act in certain circumstances, however much one may hope they will never arise, is itself, here and now, immoral. If therefore, as we are assuming, the NATO deterrent consists in a seriously intended threat to wreak indiscriminate destruction on enemy cities, it is an immoral policy which no one may formally approve, and in the execution of which no one may directly participate. The fact, if it be a fact, that nothing less than a serious intention to carry out this threat can provide a sufficient deterrent in the present circumstances, or that its withdrawal would make an unjust and disastrous war more likely, is irrelevant to the moral issue. Self-defence justifies many things which would otherwise be morally wrong, but it can never justify anything which, like direct killing of the innocent, is intrinsically evil. Even if a single wilful murder would save the world from destruction, it would still be gravely wrong to commit it.

It does not follow, however, as some seem to assume, that it is intrinsically evil to make or store nuclear weapons, desirable though it may be that they should all be suppressed by effective international agreement. As long as there remain legitimate targets, such as large military bases or fleets at sea, to which the destructive power of even the major nuclear weapons is not demonstrably disproportionate, there can in principle be legitimate uses for such weapons and therefore it cannot be wrong, *per se* and in principle, to make or store them. If it could be proved beyond reasonable doubt that their use on any major scale would involve radio-active effects, outside the target area, of a gravity such as to outweigh any intended good, then indeed their use on that scale would have to be condemned. But these effects are not apparently intrinsic to their use, at least to any great degree; for we are assured by experts that constant and successful efforts have been made to reduce the fall-out, which has little military value and is liable to harm the user, and that "hydrogen bombs that are 95 per cent clean are now obtainable".<sup>1</sup> We do not offer this as a cheering piece of news, but at least

<sup>1</sup> Dr P. E. Hodgson, in a Sword of the Spirit pamphlet, *Just War? Papal Teaching on Nuclear Warfare, with a Scientific Commentary*, p. 41.

it is relevant to any moral argument based on allegedly inseparable effects. We share the pessimism of those who fear that, if the tragedy of a nuclear war were to occur, neither the criminal use of these weapons nor a disastrous increase of radio-activity would in fact be avoided; but one cannot logically condemn nuclear weapons as evil intrinsically and *per se*, because of effects which they are likely to have extrinsically and *per accidens*. The practical and pastoral conclusion of this is that absolution cannot be refused to a Catholic who is engaged in the making of these weapons, or who, in time of war, might be ordered to use them, provided he is firmly resolved never to use them immorally. It is for him to decide whether it might be wise for him to evade the dilemma by seeking betimes some other occupation.

Finally, no government is morally bound, *per se* and in principle, to declare antecedently to the world that it will in no circumstances misuse these weapons. Potential aggressors have no title in justice to be informed beforehand how their victims may react to an aggression, and, in any case, no NATO government could reliably guarantee what its successor might or might not do. There is therefore nothing intrinsically immoral in leaving potential aggressors to guess. If this uncertainty serves to deter them, well and good.

#### LOSS ARISING FROM UNFULFILLED CONTRACT

Peter having agreed to pay Paul £100 for a number of trees, Paul proceeded to fell the trees. Peter however failed to keep the agreement and some of the felled trees were stolen. To prevent the rest being stolen, Paul put them to use, though he would not have cut them down had there been no agreement of purchase. Nine years having now elapsed since the agreement, Paul cannot introduce an action for damages. Is Peter bound in conscience to make good the loss to Paul, and if so, to what extent? (F. C.)

#### REPLY

There are two possible sources of an obligation to restore. The first, which arises from possession of another's property

against the owner's reasonable will (*detentio rei alienae*) and entails an obligation to restore, whether or not possession has been obtained unjustly, is clearly not applicable to Peter, unless perchance it was he that stole the felled trees. The second source, unjust and culpable damage done to another's property (*damnificatio rei alienae*), pre-supposes three conditions. In the first place the damaging action or omission must have been really unjust, in that it injured another, contrary to his reasonable will, in respect of some good to which he had a strict right, *in re* or *ad rem*.<sup>1</sup> Secondly the action or omission must have been the cause, properly so called, i.e. *per se* and of its nature, of the loss or damage actually sustained by the other. Thirdly, the action or omission must have been theologically culpable, i.e. imputable as a formal sin. Prior to a judicial sentence, therefore, no obligation of restitution can arise from a mere accident or from a purely juridical fault, unless the party in question has previously bound himself by contract to compensate for loss or damage caused in that way. The solution of the case depends on whether all these three conditions were fulfilled in Peter's omission to keep his agreement.

More detailed information about the terms of the agreement and the reason for Peter's default would have been helpful; but if we can assume that a valid deed or contract of sale and purchase was duly concluded and that Peter had no just ground for his failure to fulfil his part of the bargain, his default was an act of real injustice to Paul. If we can also assume that it was theologically culpable, the only question that remains to be answered is whether and to what extent it was a real cause of loss to Paul.

To determine this, it is necessary first to establish whether ownership of the trees had changed hands before some of them were stolen and the rest were put to use by Paul. This is a point of law on which a legal opinion should in practice be sought. The precise date of transfer of property may have been settled by the terms of the agreement; otherwise, if we rightly understand the English law on the point (and if English law is in force

<sup>1</sup> A man has a *ius in re* to any existing thing which is already his property by a just title. He has a *ius ad rem* to anything which he is justly entitled to obtain through the action of another, e.g. through the fulfilment of a just contract.

in the British colony from which this question came), property would not be deemed to have been transferred unless and until the trees sold had been ascertained and put into a deliverable state and the buyer notified thereof. We clearly cannot adjudicate on this point of fact and must limit ourselves to stating the consequences of the two alternatives. If property had been transferred before the theft, the position is that Peter owes Paul the £100 he had agreed to pay, plus the interest which would have accrued to that sum in the interval since payment was due. He can deduct the value of the trees which Paul put to use, but must himself stand the loss resulting from the theft of his own property, because *res perit domino*; his only claim on that score is against the thief, unless, under the terms of the agreement, Paul is to blame for failing to prevent the theft. On the other hand, if property was not transferred before the theft, it was Paul who lost the stolen trees. In that case Peter is not bound to compensate him for them, because his failure to keep his bargain was in no proper sense a *causa per se* of the theft, but at most the occasion. As for the rest of the trees which Paul put to his own use, Peter need only compensate him for the difference in value to him of the use to which he put them and the price which he would have received for them, if the bargain had been kept, because, on the hypothesis that property had not been transferred, this is the limit of the damage, if any, which Peter's default really and unjustly caused to Paul's property.

The fact that, owing to the lapse of time, Paul can no longer institute an action for damages is morally irrelevant. Authors are agreed that the Statutes of Limitation merely extinguish the creditor's right of action in law, and have no effect on the debtor's obligation in conscience, except when (and there is no room for the exception here) it is extinguished by liberative prescription.

#### INSUFFICIENTLY BAKED ALTAR BREADS

A number of priests have recently remarked that altar breads supplied to them appear to be dried paste, rather than baked paste. It has been suggested that some makers of these

bread is more concerned that they shall be white and shiny than that they shall be valid matter for the sacrament. What is strictly required for the validity? (Sacerdos.)

REPLY

Canon 814: "Sacrosanctum Missae sacrificium offerri debet ex pane et vino, cui modicissima aqua miscenda est."

Canon 815: "Panis debet esse mere triticeus et recenter confectus ita ut nullus sit periculum corruptionis."

It will be seen that the law is not particularly specific, but it is certainly required for the validity that the matter be bread, as this is understood in the common estimation of mankind. "Quod in universum est observandum ad huiusmodi quaestiones, non tam debere attendi unitatem, vel diversitatem specificam materiae, quam si iuxta communem usum reputatur pro pane talis materia, necne."<sup>1</sup> In common estimation, the four essential qualities of bread are that it be made of wheaten flour, mixed with natural water, baked by fire, and substantially incorrupt. The question concerns the precise meaning of the third of these elements, "baked by fire".

There can be no doubt that a sliver of wheaten paste or dough which has been merely dried out by exposure to heat is not bread, as commonly understood, and therefore not valid matter for consecration. But, though all the authors insist that the paste must be "igne coctus", none of those consulted attempts to define the degree of heat and the amount of exposure to it that is required to effect the chemical change which makes paste into bread, and is commonly called "baking". Murray's *New English Dictionary*, to which one confidently looks for a reliable definition of common usage, is scarcely more helpful. It defines the verb "bake" as "to cook by dry heat acting by conduction, and not by radiation, hence either in a closed place (oven, ashes, etc.), or on a heated surface (bake-stone, griddle, live coals)". Our correspondent can presumably take it for granted that the hosts supplied to him have had heat applied to them by conduction. His doubt relates rather to the

<sup>1</sup> Lugo, *De Eucharistia*, disp. IV, sect. I, n. 6.

amount of heat. On this, the only information we can offer him is that, according to the *British Encyclopaedia*, baking heat is of the order of  $450^{\circ}$ – $500^{\circ}$  Fahrenheit. We have clearly no means of knowing whether all makers of altar breads use a heat of this order, but, if they do, they can scarcely fail to make a true bread, because the layer of paste is so extremely thin that even a brief application to it of such heat would appear to be sufficient to "bake" it, in the common sense of the term.

Should there be ground for positive doubt, it must be solved by direct investigation, because it is at least unlawful to use doubtful matter. If, therefore, a priest has good reason to suspect that the hosts supplied to him have been dried rather than baked, it is his duty to discover whether or not the makers have duly observed the essentials of the baking process, as commonly understood.

#### BELLS AT SIDE-ALTAR MASSES

The opinion has been expressed in THE CLERGY REVIEW that it is unbecoming, though not expressly forbidden, to distract the attention of those assisting at Mass on the high altar by the ringing of bells at Masses celebrated simultaneously on side altars. How does this square with the doctrine I was taught in the seminary, that it is possible, with due attention to the Mass at which one is assisting, to join also in the offering of other Masses by adverting to the bells which mark their progress? If it is possible to assist at them in this way, is it not desirable that the opportunity to do so be provided? (Dunnite.)

#### REPLY

It is certainly possible, while assisting at a Mass on the high altar, to join in the offering of other Masses celebrated at side altars, but, though it may be helpful to some people's private devotion to be reminded of the progress of these other Masses by the ringing of bells, it is not at all necessary to true spiritual union with the sacrificial offering.



Pope Pius XII explained, in *Mediator Dei*,<sup>1</sup> why and how "all the faithful, *especially those present at Mass*, participate in the offering", and "why it is true to say that the whole Church makes the offering of the victim through Christ". They do so, he said, "inasmuch as they unite their sentiments of praise, entreaty, expiation and thanksgiving with the sentiments or intention of the priest, indeed with those of the High Priest Himself, in order that in the very oblation of the victim, those sentiments may be presented to God the Father also by the priest's external rite". It is clear therefore that this union of sentiments is not dependent on actual attention, summoned by the ringing of bells, or even on physical presence. The Mass, said the Pope, everywhere and of its nature has a public and social character, being offered in the name both of Christ and of the faithful of whom He is the Head; "and this happens whether the faithful are present—and we would indeed have them assisting in great numbers and with great devotion—or whether they are absent, because it is in no way necessary that the people should ratify what has been done by the sacred minister".

This is not to deny that it can be easier to unite one's sentiments and intention with Masses offered in one's immediate vicinity, if their progress can be followed through some external and sensible indication, such as that afforded by bells. Since, however, actual attention to such Masses is not required for fruitful spiritual union with them, it would seem preferable to concentrate one's actual attention on the Mass at which one is assisting, or at least not to dissipate it by attempting to do too many things at once. Union of spirit with other Masses, whether offered close at hand or far away, need not and should not be a source of distraction from the immediate object of devotion. As to whether the ringing of bells at side altars is in fact a source of distraction, that, of course, will depend on variable factors which make it impossible to generalize, such as, for example, the size and shape of the church, the decibel potential of the bells, the vigour with which they are rung by self-assertive servers, and the personal reaction of people within ear-shot. We prefer to express no opinion, except that distraction is undesirable.

<sup>1</sup> C.T.S. translation, *Christian Worship*, nn. 95 ff.

## SERVILE WORK ON HOLY DAYS IN CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS

What is the obligation of a convent in respect of Catholic women doing manual work on Holidays of Obligation, e.g. cleaners, laundry-workers, etc.? Many of these workers are paid by the hour. Since non-Catholics work their usual hours on such days, Catholics are at a disadvantage, if they are not employed, and tend to seek work elsewhere. (M. St M.)

## REPLY

"The obligation of a positive law generally ceases when its observance is accidentally conjoined with a grave loss or inconvenience which is not intrinsic to it."<sup>1</sup> The application of this universally admitted principle provides one way of explaining and justifying the widespread practice, in this country, of disregarding the prohibition of servile work on feasts of precept other than Sundays. In most cases, where the work is done for pay, it cannot be suspended on a weekday feast, without serious loss to the worker, or serious inconvenience to the employer. Moreover, there are certain kinds of work, and in particular of domestic work, which cannot without grave inconvenience be altogether omitted on any day, Sundays included. On the other hand, there are instances in which the above-mentioned excuse is not clearly applicable and is not commonly claimed. So, for example, it is customary in many Catholic institutions in this country to grant a paid holiday to non-essential workers on all feasts of precept, and, in the view of some writers who have discussed this question, it is not merely a laudable custom, but a matter of obligation,<sup>2</sup> because when no loss is caused to the employee and no grave inconvenience to the employer, the law continues to bind.

The case in question, however, is not quite of this kind. The

<sup>1</sup> Genicot-Gortebecke, *Inst. Theol. Mor.*, I, n. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Mahoney, *Priests' Problems*, qu. 264; Connell, in *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, December 1954, p. 400.

employer is a Catholic institution and could presumably, without grave inconvenience, forgo the services of its cleaners and laundry-workers on days of precept; but the issue is complicated by the fact that many of them are paid by the hour and therefore, unlike full-time servants whose contract of service entails paid holidays, they would lose their title to remuneration if they were not allowed to work, and the institution would then be liable to lose their services altogether. The inconvenience to both sides may well be considerable and cannot easily be removed, for it would be unrealistic to suggest that casual workers should be treated like permanent staff and be paid for hours they might have worked on holy days, but have not. In our view, this practical difficulty constitutes an excuse sufficient to justify the convent in question in allowing its casual workers, Catholic or non-Catholic, to render their usual hourly-paid services on holy days.

It is not, however, certain that an excuse is needed, because there is probability in the opinion that, arising out of the general inapplicability of the law to workaday feasts, a contrary custom has been legitimately established in this country, whereby the prohibition of servile work has ceased to bind on such days. The reasonableness of a custom to this effect can readily be found in the contradiction intrinsic to the very notion of a workaday feast. When the law was first laid down that certain holy days were to be observed by attendance at Mass and abstinence from servile work, it was taken for granted that social convention would comply with the will of the Church and observe them as holidays, and it is extremely unlikely that these obligations would otherwise have been imposed on the faithful. Indeed, even today, in predominantly Catholic countries such as Italy, France, Spain and Belgium, the Church enforces as of obligation only those feasts which the State has been persuaded, usually through a Concordat, to recognize as public holidays. The Italian Concordat of 1929 recognizes the complete list of feasts prescribed in canon 1247, and so Italy keeps them all, but France observes only the four (Christmas, Ascension, Assumption, All Saints) which Napoleon agreed, in 1802, to accept as national holidays. In other words, the Church is appreciative of the fact that an ecclesiastical obligation of

repose from servile work is incompatible with a social obligation of working as usual.

If therefore this obligation applies *per se* to our different situation in this country, it is only that we have not been specially exempted from the terms of a law which, like laws in general, was made "*pro ordinariæ contingentibus*", the ordinary situation being, in the mind of the legislator, that in which an obligation with social effects has the necessary backing of social convention. It is true that, until the introduction of evening Mass, a similar anomaly was to be found in the obligation of attendance at Mass on workaday feasts, which nevertheless has remained in force: but that is because our Catholic working population, with self-sacrificing devotion, continued to turn out to Mass in the early morning hours, notwithstanding inconveniences which any continental theologian would regard as more than a sufficient excuse. There has been no such devotion to the obligation of repose on these holy days which are not holidays. It has long been customary to disregard it, because, unlike the Mass obligation, it cannot be substantially observed even at the cost of a greater effort of self-sacrifice than the legislator intended. For the vast majority it is an intrinsically impracticable obligation. One of the proper and honest functions of contrary custom is to temper or relax such obligations, and it is reasonable to maintain that custom in this country has long since had its appropriate effect on this particular obligation.

L. L. McR.

#### SIGNS OF THE CROSS IN THE CANON OF MASS

What is the meaning of the many crosses made over the *oblata* in the canon of Mass, especially after the Consecration? (M. K., Luxembourg.)

#### REPLY

This query has occupied the attention of liturgists since the eighth century when these crosses—six series of them, amoun-

ting to twenty crosses if we exclude the final clause of the canon where the sign is traced with the Sacred Host—first began to appear in the MSS. of the canon. Indeed there is extant a reply of Pope St Zachary in 751 to St Boniface, the English apostle of Germany, who had written to him asking what was the correct arrangement of these crosses. The Pope sent him a rotulus with the text of the canon showing the disposition of the crosses in Rome at that time. During the Middle Ages there was a crop of allegorical explanations of the crosses, as one would expect, some of them very fanciful indeed.

It is not difficult to explain the sign of the cross accompanying the word *benedicere* as in *Te igitur*, or in the prayer *Quam oblationem* or at each consecration,<sup>1</sup> where an invocative blessing of the *oblata* is implied, since by the eighth century this gesture of blessing was already supplanting the earlier one of extending the hand over the person or object to be blessed. In any case in these four cases the cross is being made over the *oblata* while they are yet bread and wine only. There may be question also of an invocative blessing in the prayer *Per quem* towards the end of the canon, especially if *haec omnia* are to be understood as primarily not referring to the Eucharistic species, but to material things such as fruit, that during the Middle Ages were sometimes blessed at this point in the canon (as the Oil of the Sick is now consecrated on Maundy Thursday), and there too the word *benedicis* occurs. But the crosses made over the Sacred Species in the prayers *Unde et memores* and *Supplices* are not, of course, gestures of blessing but are—in the opinion of the best liturgists<sup>2</sup>—stylized gestures of indication, a ritual way of pointing to the Body and Blood being then spoken about. Such an indicative gesture can indeed in a certain context—when an offering which we wish to present to God can be expressed only by a symbolical gesture—be actually a gesture of oblation.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The original meaning at the Consecration is more probably *gratias agere* (with the meaning of praising God) as used by SS. Luke and Paul for the consecration of the bread (where SS. Matthew and Mark use *benedicere*) and SS. Matthew and Mark for the consecration of the wine.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Fr J. A. Jungmann, S.J., in *Missarium Sollemnia* (French version, III, pp. 53 sqq.).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

## MUSIC OF THE PROPER OF A MASS

Does the Instruction *De Sacra Musica* of September 1958 forbid, in n. 21c, the singing of the Proper of a Mass in a polyphonic or harmonic setting? (B. O'B., New Zealand.)

## REPLY

No. Paragraph 21c of the Instruction is dealing only with the *minimum* that must be done in any high Mass—the liturgical texts must be sung (*cantentur*), it is not sufficient merely to recite them—but the singing in cases of special difficulty, which §21c contemplates, may consist of chanting in a monotone. If, however, the choir is capable of singing the Proper in polyphony (cf. §17) or in modern musical settings—provided these are suitable (cf. §§18 and 50) for liturgical use—this is not ruled out, and may be very appropriate for special occasions. See the reply to this query by Fr F. R. McManus in *Worship*, November 1959 (p. 660), and Fr Mytych's *Digest of Church Law on Sacred Music*, p. 32.

J. B. O'C.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Christian Yoga*. By J. M. Déchanet, o.s.b. Translated by Roland Hindmarsh. (Burns Oates. 21s.)

AFTER three French editions *La voie du Silence* has been brought out in English. It is important not to misunderstand what the author is trying to do. He is not anxious to Christianize the philosophy of Indian Yoga with its ultimate Pantheism, nor yet is he content simply to take out of the Yoga system a few rules for physical culture and apply them to a Christian purpose, but he wants something midway between these two extremes. He thinks that the Yoga technique of breath-control can be made to serve Christian meditation, and in two Appendices has added material to show that this was the way followed by the Palamists of Byzantium. The slowing-

up of the rhythm of breathing as a help to the repetition of vocal prayer figures as one of the methods described in the *Spiritual Exercises* of St Ignatius, though it is seldom given much attention in retreats, but what is here proposed is much more than this. In an appendix on the Palamists' Jesus-prayer, by a certain M. Gouillard, the aim of this is said to be "the exploration of the visceral self". Adepts of the method, he says, promise that it will produce euphoria, indifference to physical pain, fleeting communications with a deceased spiritual director and perception of the kingdom of heaven within oneself. That is a formidable list. Dom Déchanet does not speak of all these, and he prints a warning article of Père Régamey who says that the techniques "are only intended to remove certain barriers to the action of the supernatural".

It is not everyone that is able to treat his body as a jack-knife while reciting phrases from the 50th Psalm, and one cannot expect a very wide success for the book among the clergy. Did not the old Irish ascetics, with their multiple genuflections and recitations, and the *crossfigil* (or prayer with the arms extended, until one grew tired), know something about making body and soul work together as a true *compositum*? Yet they do not seem to have claimed that it produced euphoria; rather the contrary. Fr Déchanet is discreetly autobiographical, saying, for instance, that he was prevented from any kind of athletic activity by ill-health in his youth and did not learn to swim till he was forty-two. He does not make it clear how long he has kept up the Yoga exercises, but implies that two or more years of practice had preceded the publication of the first edition in 1956. While not exactly in his first fervour, he cannot be termed an old hand.

It is curious that Fr de Nobili, S.J., though he tried to live as a Brahmin, does not seem to have been tempted to take up Yoga as a means of adaptation to his Indian background. A Baroque Italian would naturally find more difficulty with the "cobra posture" or the "locust"; but it may be that the theological problem was more present to his mind. Fr Déchanet has a few pages about the Christian idea of the redemption of the body, but they are somewhat inadequate. He says that the sacraments use physical substances to work within the soul, but his examples are not very apt. "My hands are ineffaceably consecrated because an oil, which is also consecrated, has penetrated them and not merely touched, but impregnated the muscles." This may suit a sentimental French reader, but a logical Englishman will wonder why he chose a part of the rite which is not the essential sacrament. Similarly, it is the contract of marriage that gives grace *ex opere operato*, and not, save in very rare circumstances,



the consummation. In the Eucharist, the Body of Christ is a glorified body. It is only baptism that really fits his argument.

*The Religious Orders of Men.* By Jean Canu. (Faith and Fact, No. 84. Burns Oates. 8s. 6d.)

THIS book seems to have two aims: to give some brief historical details about the various Orders that have existed in the Church, with a modern *tour d'horizon*, and also to explain in an elementary way the difference of contemplative and active or mixed lives. On the historical side it would be true to say that in France today there is no modern work comparable to Fr David Knowles' four volumes on the religious Orders in England up to the Reformation, and though this work is listed in the bibliography, the author does not seem to have laid it under tribute; anyone who compares his page on the originality of the Dominican system of government with Fr David's will see the difference at once. No English Benedictine could accept what is said here (p. 83), that the first Congregation of abbeys to be founded was that of St Justina of Padua in 1412, when their own is 200 years older. No mention is made of the work of the late R. A. L. Smith, nor of Mr Pantin's researches on the Chapters of the Black Monks, nor does our one purely English religious Order, the Gilbertines of Sempringham, receive notice. The controversy that rages about the *Regula magistri* and its relation to that of St Benedict is also passed over in silence. There has been much recent controversy about St Patrick, but to claim, as this author does, that St Patrick was a disciple of Martin of Tours and "brought the Gospel to Ireland about the beginning of the fifth century", will please none of the contenders. Has there been a confusion with St Ninian, or is the legend that Concessa, the mother of St Patrick, was a relative of St Martin, being taken too seriously? Coming nearer the present time, one notices that the suppression of the Jesuits is misunderstood. Not only in eastern Europe did they continue to exist, but also at Liège where the English Jesuits were immediately turned into a congregation *iuris diocesani* by the Prince-bishop, an act for which he obtained papal approval as soon as Clement XIV was dead. The author speaks of a few Jesuits "crossing the Atlantic and settling in Maryland, where in 1789 they founded Georgetown University", as if these were fugitives. In fact there had been English Jesuits in Maryland since 1635, and a good proportion of those in training at Liège in 1773 were of American origin. The translator of the book has done his work well, but it is questionable whether more revision ought not to have been undertaken before a French work was released to the English reading-public.

*John Chrysostom and his Time. Volume I: Antioch. By Chrysostom Baur, o.s.b. Translated by Sister M. Gonzaga, r.s.m. (Sands 30s.)*

DOM BAUR has devoted a long life to the study of Chrysostom and his book came out in Germany in 1929. A second edition was issued after the war, about 1947, and it is from this that the translation has been made. The second edition differed from the first, not so much in the text as in the addition of many new references in the footnotes. The author remarked in his first edition that he had thrown some of his ballast overboard to get his work off the ground, but the amount which of necessity remains gives the book a somewhat prickly appearance. None the less, the chapters on Chrysostom's youth and his joys and sorrows as a preacher will be helpful to the general reader, who might otherwise be troubled by a haunting fear that what he found attributed to a sermon of Chrysostom was really the product of some later Byzantine. Fr Smothers, s.j., who has himself worked on the MSS. of Chrysostom, has given some help to the translator, but there is one disconcerting slip which has not been noticed. In describing the Easter vigil of that day, it is said (p. 198) that "hundreds of even thousands" came to be baptized, where the German text has "hundreds *and* even thousands"; had he to face so many, Chrysostom would have been at work till late on the Sunday itself. The book would have been helped by a plan of Antioch, especially since the American archaeologists have done so much work on its topography in recent times.

Chapters on Chrysostom as exegete, as classical scholar, as apologist, as moralist, show how the material found in his sermons can be organized for the use of a modern reader, and Dom Baur is not afraid to admit that in his teaching on marriage Chrysostom was not entirely satisfactory. Perhaps here, as elsewhere, he had not reduced to a harmony various theological principles which he had taken over separately from his predecessors. Thus he can say outright that the words of Christ, uttered in the Mass, consecrate the bread, and again that the descent of the Spirit consecrates; he did not think he was contradicting himself, but the spur of theological interest that would have led him to reconcile the two propositions did not touch him just at that point. Since 1947 much work has been done on the internal arrangement of early Syrian churches, particularly by M. Jean Lassus, and it is now fairly certain that Antioch would have had the bishop's throne on a *bema* (or raised platform) in the centre of the nave, from which the reading of the Gospels and the preaching would have been done, and it would have helped the reader if he had been given the benefit of these new results of

research. Volume II in the German deals with Chrysostom at Constantinople, his dealings with the Court, his reforms and banishment. When this is translated, there will be available in English what has for some time been the standard work on Chrysostom.

*Elementary Patrology.* By Aloys Dirksen, C.P.P.S. (B. Herder Book Company. 30s.)

IN spite of the existence of very detailed works on patrology by Quasten and by Altaner there is room for an elementary work where, shorn of the apparatus of learning, the simple facts about the great writers of the early Church could be made available. This Fr Dirksen has set out to do in a business-like way, devoting some 200 pages to the main figures from Clement of Rome to Isidore and John Damascene, and then following this up with about ninety pages of glossary, where the lesser writers, anonymous works, apocryphal Gospels and the like are listed with a brief description. There is also a list of heresies, covering another ten pages. As always in such simplified works, there can be different opinions about the presentation of the matter, and, while Fr Dirksen does not give any bibliographical material about individual Fathers, the scale of his treatment (five pages for Origen, six for Chrysostom, one for Cyril of Jerusalem) seems right, and he takes care to point out to the student which doctrines are stressed, or possibly mishandled, in a particular writer. There are a few places where the work could have been improved; thus it is not enough now to say of the *Gospel of Thomas* that it was Gnostic and has been lost, or to present the letter of Polycarp as being two separate epistles (without pointing out that this is simply a theory of a recent critic, however convincing some may think it), or to say without hesitation that the Der-Balyzeh liturgical papyrus is of the third century. A note of caution to the student about the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus would have been welcome; discrepancies between the Oriental and the Latin versions of this work need to be stressed, and the general liability of any and every liturgical text to suffer interpolations could have been illustrated by reference to any modern sacristy. There are a few misprints, Polycratus of Edessa appearing in the catalogue for Polycrates of Ephesus.

*Letters from the early Church.* By Roger Lloyd. (George Allen & Unwin. 13s. 6d.)

To describe the scenes of events in the Acts of the Apostles as if through the eyes of someone present is not easy and some of these

sketches by Canon Roger Lloyd do not quite succeed. His best are the Pentecost happenings, related by a visiting lawyer from Pontus, and the martyrdom of James, dramatized out of the account in Eusebius. In general the letters are somewhat too sophisticated for ancient writers, who had not the habit, bred of lifelong novel-reading, of scrutinizing their own emotions. Fr Martindale, in his *Letters from their Aunts*, was much nearer to the style and tone of what one can still read in the papyri, among the private letters there preserved, and he managed to catch the open-eyed directness of their talk: "My hair-slave Thalassia is being a trouble to me because she is a friend of a girl called Damaris who somehow got mixed up with a Jew who has come here called Paullus." The writers in Canon Lloyd's collection are too reflective: "Will our Christian descendants, I wonder, realize how much the writing of letters has done to create the heritage they will enter upon?" Silvanus is made to write four of the letters, but strangely refrains from any use of the Old Testament. A letter from the lawyer of Pontus to Silvanus very cleverly puts forward the questions to which I Peter can be assumed to be a reply. Catholics should be warned that the hierarchical structure here sketched is one of James being in command of the Church; Peter is made to write to him as, "my master whom I now acknowledge to be set over me by Christ Jesus in the Church". This is a long way from the respectful attitude of James to Peter at the Council of Jerusalem where, as I have argued elsewhere (*Scripture*, 1954, pp. 67-75), James is content to put a supplementary proposal when Peter has made the main decision. Canon Lloyd unaccountably dates the escape of Peter from prison to A.D. 36, a time when his captor, Herod Agrippa, was himself immured in a Roman gaol. In fact the escape was probably in the year 45, for in that year the last day of the Pasch fell on a Saturday, and the small gathering at the house of John Mark's mother would have been keeping their Easter vigil when Peter came to them in the small hours of Sunday morning.

J. H. CREHAN, S.J.

*Liturgy and Architecture.* By Peter Hammond. Pp. xv + 191. (Barrie and Rockcliff. 37s. 6d.)

THE official Catholic definition of the Sacred Liturgy is "the public worship which our Redeemer, the Head of the Church, offers to the heavenly Father and which the community of Christ's faithful pays to its Founder, and through him to the Eternal Father; briefly, it is the whole public worship of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, Head and members".<sup>1</sup> Prescinding from its theological implica-

<sup>1</sup> Pius XII, *Mediator Dei*, §20.

tions this definition is, apparently, acceptable to those members of the Church of England and other religious denominations who concern themselves with the forms of public worship. The liturgical movement, too—that movement which aims at giving both clergy and laity a deeper and more correct understanding of the real meaning of the Sacred Liturgy and at leading the people to take an active, intelligent, conscious part in public worship—is nowadays interesting not only Catholics but other religious bodies also. One happy result of this interest in the Liturgy is this remarkable book, *Liturgy and Architecture*, by the Rev. Peter Hammond, a clergyman of the Church of England. Obviously its author has studied the liturgical movement not only in Britain but abroad, not only in the Anglican Communion but also in the Catholic Church, and in some of the Free Church congregations, and he shows a wide and intimate knowledge of the literature that has sprung from it. What is important, however, is that Mr Hammond has fully grasped the basic principles of that movement in all their bearings. As the title of his book indicates in three words, he applies these principles to church building and does so with keen insight and remarkable vigour.

As I read this book my interest in, and enthusiasm for, its teachings grew stronger and stronger, and I found myself frequently murmuring "hear! hear!"

While Mr Hammond wrote his book with the needs of his own Anglican Communion chiefly in view—both in the things which he praises and those which he reproves—he shows a wide knowledge of the views of modern Catholic liturgists and a practical acquaintance with Catholic churches, good and bad, which have been built since the war. His book is full of sound, practical ideas—which, rightly, he repeats over and over again in order to drive them well home—on the true nature of the function of a church, to house an altar and a worshipping congregation, and on the bearing of the Liturgy on church building, a subject still so little understood by some of the clergy, and by many architects and artists.

It is a perennial subject for discussion whether the rubrical correctness of a church building—its exemplification of true liturgical principles, its fitness for the requirements of the Liturgy—is the responsibility of the clergy who commission the planning and construction of a church or of the architect who undertakes the task. Surely the true answer to this problem is that the rubrical correctness concerns both the architect and his client. It must be said, however, that the responsibility falls chiefly on the former.

Not many priests who have to get a church built or renovated

profess to be expert rubricians, but any architect who undertakes to plan and build a church *does* profess to be an expert. Just as he would not undertake the task of building a hospital or a school without an exact acquaintance with every detail which the use of each of these buildings requires, so he should not undertake the planning and construction of a church without a competent knowledge of the liturgical principles which govern that special form of building and the rubrics that determine in detail its needs. In truth, the solution of the problem of building not only a sound and beautiful edifice, but also one that will be liturgically irreproachable, demands (as Mr Hammond observes, p. 169) "systematic research such as has already been attempted in other branches of architecture—notably that of school building—by architects, theologians, liturgists and sociologists working as a team". And the members of such a team cannot fit themselves better for their task than by a careful study of Mr Hammond's book, which is full of sound principles and good advice.

I would like to quote paragraph after paragraph from it but the limits of the space assigned for a review, even when generously drawn, will not allow this, nor would it be fair to Mr Hammond and his publishers. All who are interested in good church building should acquire this book and study it with care; their labour will be repaid one hundredfold in profit and pleasure.

I do not agree with Mr Hammond's remark (p. 45) that "the problem of creating an appropriate spatial setting for the administration of the sacrament of baptism is a particularly intractable one". For a Catholic church this problem is solved by authentic tradition—based on practical and symbolical reasons—and by the ritual requirements of the baptismal ceremonies which, when correctly carried out, take place in a porch or narthex, in the church, and finally in the baptistry. I am in agreement with much that Mr Hammond writes about a free-standing altar—except when it is so placed that it is entirely surrounded by the congregation on all four sides, to this there are liturgical and practical objections—but for Catholics the chief reason why an altar which is to be consecrated as a "fixed altar" must not be placed against a wall is that the ceremony of the consecration requires that the consecrating prelate and others must be able to pass freely around the altar.

For full measure Mr Hammond gives an interesting, if rather selective, bibliography, with pertinent remarks on the contents and value of many of the books. There are fifty-three photographs and seventy plans, showing what is correct and desirable and what is not.

May *Liturgy and Architecture* have a very big circulation. It should

do immense good. It is a notable contribution to modern liturgical literature.

*Vestments and Church Furniture.* By Robert Lesage. Pp. 155. (Burns and Oates, 8s. 6d.)

THIS book is Volume 113 in the famous Faith and Fact series and is a translation of the book *Objets et Habits Liturgiques* published in 1958. In 1952 Mgr Lesage had written a book entitled *Linges et Vêtements Liturgiques* and his later volume is a revised and enlarged edition of this. Mgr Lesage is best known as the chief master of ceremonies of the Archbishop of Paris, and as the author of *Dictionnaire Pratique de Liturgie Romaine* (1952). This new book of his gives a succinct but excellent account of vestments and church furniture with the history of their origin and their present use. The author concentrates quite an extraordinary amount of accurate information into a small space. The book has been brought up to date by the inclusion of S.R.C. legislation of 1957 on the tabernacle and on the form of vestments and by taking account of the new Holy Week *Ordo*.

*Scripture in the Liturgy.* By Rev. Charles Burgard. Pp. x + 163. (Challoner Publications. Cloth 15s.; paper 11s. 6d.)

THIS book is an English version of *La Bible dans la Liturgie*, a review of which appeared in THE CLERGY REVIEW of July 1958.

One of the great handicaps to the more rapid understanding among the laity of the texts of the Missal and other liturgical books is their want of knowledge of Sacred Scripture. Any book that, in a popular way, helps to a greater acquaintance with the Bible aids the progress of the liturgical movement. Hence the value of Fr Burgard's book.

Once again we have to thank Challoner Publications for putting at the disposal of English readers this excellent book. The translation has been competently done by Mr J. Holland Smith. Happily he uses the Knox translation for the numerous citations from Sacred Scripture. It is a pity that the useful table of Biblical pericopes given in the French edition is wanting in the English one.

*The Mass in Meditation.* By Theodor Schnitzler. Translated by Mgr R. Kraus. Vol. II. (B. Herder Book Co. 34s.)

THE review of the first volume of this excellent book appeared in THE CLERGY REVIEW of April 1960. This first volume dealt with the heart of the Mass, the canon. The second volume treats of the parts



of the Mass that precede and follow the canon. All that was written in praise of Volume I applies to this second volume. These valuable meditations—a happy blending of history, theology, liturgy and spirituality—have their special characteristic that they are founded not on flights of spiritual fancy, which no doubt have their own value, but on a sound scientific knowledge of the Roman rite of the Mass. Fr Schnitzler finds even in the simplest gesture or prayer of the Mass a depth of meaning which cannot but help in the fruitful and worthy celebration of the great Action. It is not easy to carry out even the most sacred actions when they are frequently repeated without distraction and dryness of spirit. A careful reading of *The Mass in Meditation* from day to day at prayer-time cannot fail to enrich our thoughts and deepen our appreciation of the greatest and most important action of each day. It is full of fresh, stimulating reflexions which open our eyes to hitherto undreamed-of treasures. We render our thanks for this precious book—the fruit of eleven years of the study and teaching of the Roman rite—to Fr Schnitzler, and to Mgr Kraus whose labours have placed it at the disposal of those who do not read German.

J. B. O'C.

*What is Canon Law?* By René Metz. Translated by Michael Derrick.

Pp. 158. (Burns and Oates. Faith and Fact Books, n. 79. 8s. 6d.)

ANTIPATHY to canon law is not uncommon even among the clergy; it is regarded as an intrusion upon spiritual liberty which, if not altogether unwarranted, is at least excessive in degree. The fact that one of its main objects has always been to protect individual interests and liberties against arbitrary rule is overlooked. Canon Metz's first object therefore, in this excellent little book, is to justify the detailed juridical system of the Church and explain the special characteristics which distinguish it from other legal systems. His second object is to summarize the content of the Church's law. Since it would have been impossible to do this, in the space available, according to the order of the Code, he has preferred to arrange the material according to the three levels on which the Church legislates, her internal organization and discipline, her external relations with the State, and her regulation of the order of grace. In this way he has succeeded in compressing the picture without distortion or substantial omission. It is an extraordinarily comprehensive survey which, despite the small space, never degenerates into a catalogue, and in the main it is very accurate. There is a definite error on page 76, where the conditions for the acquisition of a domicile have been run together with those of a quasi-domicile in a manner which

suggests the omission of one or two lines in the typescript. It is also incorrect to say that, for baptism, "one godfather at least, or one godmother, if two are not available, is required" (p. 142); on the contrary, canon 704 requires "patrinus unus tantum . . . vel ad summum unus et una". And one could criticize his statement, on page 22, that whereas a democracy derives its power from the people, the Church gets hers from God; all authority is equally from God. In a work of such compression, however, the standard of accuracy is very high. The translation is excellent, and the book can be cordially recommended.

*Problems in Theology. II. The Commandments.* By Very Rev. J. Canon McCarthy, D.D., D.C.L. Pp. xiii + 588. (Browne and Nolan, Dublin. 40s.)

FOUR years ago Canon McCarthy, who, during his professorship at Maynooth, contributed a regular series of theological replies and notes to *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, published a classified selection of those dealing with sacramental problems. Here, in this second volume, he covers moral theology in general, arranged under the headings of Human Acts, the Ten Commandments and the Precepts of the Church, and concludes with a series of dogmatico-moral topics which manifest the breadth and diversity of his professional competence. It is natural to a work of this kind, the material of which was originally determined by the current interests of readers of the periodical in which it appeared, that it should concentrate mainly on current issues. So, under the First Commandment, most of the replies deal with problems of religious co-operation created by our religiously divided society. The Fifth Commandment provides the framework of a practical treatise, summary but comprehensive, on modern medico-moral problems, in which, it may be added, the author's grasp of the medical facts seems hardly less expert than his understanding of the relevant moral principles. Under the Sixth and Ninth, it is the moral difficulties connected with the use of marriage that predominate, and, under the Seventh and Tenth, the problems of Justice in the form they are nowadays apt to take. This latter section, the largest in the book, covers most of the ground of the treatise *De Iure et Iustitia*, but presents it in a much more palatable form. The material included under Precepts of the Church is naturally coloured to some degree by its largely Irish origin, but the dogmatico-moral section is catholic in both senses of the word; one wonders only how *Alcoholics Anonymous* got into it.

The author loves a good argument and, as some of these replies indicate, is not easily dislodged from a position he has adopted. He

makes sure that those who come to him for a solution understand the principles on which it is based.

*Fresh Hope for the World; Moral Re-Armament in Action.* Edited and Introduced by Gabriel Marcel. Translated from the French by Helen Hardinge. Pp. vii + 215. (Longmans. 16s.)

ABOUT 1952, Mgr Suenens, Bishop Auxiliary of Malines, went to Caux to make an objective and documented assessment of MRA and reached the conclusion that, notwithstanding the great amount of good achieved by its sincere and zealous adherents, it was "a religious movement of Protestant inspiration". Writing as a Catholic theologian he substantiated this conclusion with sober theological arguments based on uncontrovertible facts.<sup>1</sup> A few years later, Gabriel Marcel went to Caux and came away convinced that MRA was in no sense a religious movement or sect, but an adventure of Faith which needs no doctrinal form and ought to be seen "in the perspective of a lived-out ecumenical experience". A philosopher who happens to be a Catholic, but no theologian, he makes no serious effort in this book to substantiate his judgement by the accepted criteria. He is content simply to explain, in an introductory letter to three of his friends, the origin and reason of his own enthusiasm for MRA. The bulk of the book is then devoted to fourteen autobiographical accounts of conversion through MRA. This is followed by a glowing tribute to its founder, "The Universal Man—Frank Buchman", and a somewhat scrappy final section seeks to show its world-wide influence with examples drawn mainly from Japan.

The conversions related are doubtless genuine as far as they go, but, considered as effects of MRA, they are theologically incomplete. After such a conversion, lapsed Catholics may be led, as in three of the cases given, to return to the practice of their faith, but the intrinsic effect of MRA, according to Buchman himself, is that it "enhances all primary loyalties", of Moslems to Islam, Buddhists to Buddhism, and so on. "He believes," says Marcel, "that each person, in the framework of his own faith, can discover what part he should play in rebuilding the world, if he accepts this faith to the end." One understands why Cardinal Hinsley, in 1938, declared the movement to be "so tainted with indifferentism, with the error that one religion is as good as another, that no Catholic can join it to take any active part in it or co-operate with it formally". Gabriel Marcel has no such misgivings; orthodox methods having failed to heal man-

<sup>1</sup> *The Right View of Moral Re-Armament.* Burns and Oates, 1954.

kind, he is satisfied that "one has a perfect right, one is even in duty bound, to call in healers".

*The Privilege of the Faith.* By Roland Tremblay, W.F., J.C.D. Pp. 125.  
(Obtainable from the White Fathers, Oak Lodge Cottage,  
Totteridge Lane, London, N.20. 10s. Paper-bound.)

THE Church predicates absolute indissolubility only of sacramental marriages validly contracted between baptized persons and subsequently consummated. Like St Paul, she claims a vicarious divine power to dissolve marriages which, by defect of baptism, are non-sacramental, whenever such dissolution favours conversion to, or perseverance in, the Catholic faith, and she has made an increasing use of this power ever since the sixteenth century, when her missionaries first had to deal on a large scale with the marriages of polygamous converts from paganism. Fr Tremblay has therefore done a useful service to missionaries by providing, in this book, a systematic and comprehensive treatise on the whole subject. The first of the four parts into which his work is divided deals with more familiar Pauline Privilege. The second deals with dispensation from the Pauline interpellations, whether in virtue of the sixteenth-century constitutions enumerated in canon 1125 or of apostolic faculties since granted to missionaries, or in virtue of the general provisions of canons 15, 81 and 1043-5. The third part discusses the nature and extension of the privilege contained in canon 1127, and the fourth explains the conditions required in order to obtain from the exclusively competent Holy Office the dissolution of a marriage between a baptized person and an infidel. The material is tabulated throughout in schematic fashion in order to highlight the essential points and, at every stage, the proper procedure to be followed is clearly outlined. There is also a useful series of appendices. The book is primarily meant for missionaries, but should be helpful also to curial officials in nominally Christian countries where, owing to the increased number of unbaptized, the conditions for the application of the privilege are increasingly verified.

L. L. McR.

#### PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

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